A Pakistan Army convoy was ambushed on October 8 at Afghan border in Kurram district of Kohat division, resulting in killing of nine soldiers and two officers. Another attack (Nov 8) on Pak Army vehicle by TTP at Miryan tehsil of Bannu district, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa claimed life of 10 soldiers.
Pakistan’s security policy under the leadership of Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir is revealing a troubling truth: while the country faces a deepening internal violent crisis, the military establishment is pre-occupied with projecting power abroad. The argument is that Munir’s strategy neglects the lives of Pakistani soldiers and civilians, leaving internal security porous and outsourcing risk by planning deployments in Saudi Arabia, Gaza, or elsewhere to satisfy geopolitical ambitions. Recent evidence shows militant attacks have increased sharply across Pakistan, security forces are dying in large numbers, and yet the Pakistan army’s priority seems to lie in external missions, which is a clear indication that Munir does not prioritize the safety of his own people or territory.
In the past few months, Pakistan has witnessed a surge in militant violence that underscores the failure of its internal security strategy. Therefore, it is striking that Pakistan’s military establishment is moving to send troops abroad while internal threats mount. Reports from October 2025 suggest Pakistan is considering deploying as many as 20,000 soldiers to the Gaza Strip as part of an international stabilization force.Defence Minister Khawaja Asif stated that the government would involve parliament; however, the speed of these decisions and the secrecy surrounding them fuel suspicion. Pakistan’s interest in foreign missions aligns with the concept of a “Gaza stabilization force” and a new strategic defense pact with Saudi Arabia, signed in September. While projecting influence abroad, the country’s theatres of insurgency, the Pashtun belt in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, are intensifying in violence.
This mismatch between geopolitical ambitions and internal defense illustrates a deeper faultline: the army under Munir appears to value trophies abroad over the mere survival of its own forces. A suicide car bomb in North Waziristan in June 2025 killed 16 soldiers and wounded many others. Similarly, several ambushes have taken place in the last few weeks, leading to over 100 casualties of Pakistani armed forces personnel, including SSG commandos. If elite forces are being lost on Pakistan’s soil, sending troops abroad reduces the force available for internal security and diverts the leadership’s attention.
The logic of the policy is flawed. When the military is stretched thin, protecting critical infrastructure, suppressing insurgency, and now planning deployments abroad, the internal environment becomes vulnerable by default. Pakistan’s politicized, over-militarized counter-insurgency model appears to have backfired: rather than suppressing militancy, it has legitimised resentment among Pashtuns and Baloch minorities who already feel marginalized, creating a recruitment pool for extremist groups. The internal collapse of security is not being addressed; instead, the army opts for symbolic foreign missions to enhance its international image.
Moreover, the lives of Pakistani soldiers and civilians caught in crossfire are being sacrificed for vague strategic objectives. The decision to commit resources externally while failing domestically signals a dangerous neglect of duty.This policy of projection rather than protection has consequences for legitimacy and stability in Pakistan. Consequently, the public’s trust in the military is quickly declining as soldiers fall in predictable insurgent attacks and civilians are made high-profile targets. The Pakistani generals may hope that foreign deployments and defense pacts will earn them international prestige, but such actions at home feel meritless to ordinary citizens. The contrast between the army’s strong posture abroad and weak performance at home is stark and potentially explosive.
Additionally, the military’s expansion into the foreign policy domain conflicts with its primary constitutional role of defending the nation. As Munir pivots to the Middle East and seeks to play a role in Gaza, Pakistan is choosing theatres of prestige rather than zones of stickiness — i.e., internal reform, infrastructure, governance, and political inclusion. Such external engagements are costly: each soldier deployed abroad must be supported logistically, trained, and equipped, further straining a defense budget already under pressure. Meanwhile, local populations in places like Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are losing faith in the state’s ability to protect them, and more young men are being radicalized or recruited into insurgent groups.
The human rights dimension is equally critical. In Balochistan, the insurgency has seen the state respond with raids, kidnappings, and extrajudicial actions widely documented by human rights monitors. The inability of the military to control its narrativeand its failure to protect civilians contribute to cycles of violence. Pakistan’s Afghan-facing western border remains porous, allowing cross-border militants to regroup, yet instead of focusing resources there, the army targets external threats missions.
Politically, the shift in focus reflects a further weakening of civilian leadership and an increase in military dictatorship. The decision to send troops overseas is being made in military and intelligence forums, bypassing parliamentary scrutiny and public debate. Such concentration of power is eroding accountability and leading to policy choices that do not reflect national consensus in Pakistan. When the military directs its strategy against internal threats while simultaneously preparing for foreign deployments, it appears that the army’s own interests, prestige, access, and influence may outweigh those of the nation.For the individual soldier on the ground, this policy has become a grim paradox: each militant attack at home claims lives, yet the army may be using the same resources and personnel for missions in foreign lands.
Looking ahead, the outlook is troubling. Unless Pakistan reverses course and focuses wholly on internal security, the strategy of external intervention will only deepen vulnerability at home. As militants exploit distraction, weak governance, and public anger, the risk of a major attack increases in Pakistan. The troops sent abroad may return to a country less secure than when they left. The lives of soldiers and civilians caught in this strategy appear to be pawns in a game of operational prestige and foreign alignment. Munir’s vision of projecting external force might make headlines, but it weakens the core duty of the Pakistan military: to protect its people and territory safe. In this mismatch of aspiration and capability, Pakistan’s internal fault-lines grow, and the consequences could be more deadly than any foreign mission.