Pakistan came to a violent birth as a homeland for Muslims in the Indian Subcontinent and became home to the second-largest Muslim population in the world. But there is a stark paradox. About 80 years later, the country that was envisioned as a beacon of Islamic unity and justice has continued to fail its own Muslim citizens. Governments cannot ensure the peaceful religious events and processions held by different minority sects of Muslims in the country, and have to deploy army personnel in civilian areas to prevent attacks by the majority Sunni population.
Almost every province in Pakistan is busy making strong security plans for Muharram, which are aimed at maintaining peace and public safety, preventing sectarian violence and restricting inciteful and blasphemous content on social media. During the month of Muharram, when Shiites mourn the killing of the killings of the Prophet’s family, members of Sunni headline groups chant anti-Shiite slogans outside majlis (gatherings). They even demand that Shiites be declared heretics, even as the minority community remains highly vulnerable to blasphemy laws and crackdowns from the security forces.
The deep-rooted Shia-Sunni sectarian tensions have been a historical issue in South Asia but they aggravated soon after Pakistan was formed. The conflict saw a dramatic escalation in the 1980s engulfing most of Pakistan, thanks to the radical state policies, regional geopolitics, and the emergence of sectarian militant groups. Religious events and processions of other minority Muslim communities such as the Ahmadiyya, Hazara Shias, Zikris, Dawoodi Bohras are frequently attacked or disrupted in Pakistan by hardline Sunni extremist groups.
Pakistan’s military ruler General Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamisation reform programme intensified violence against minority Muslim communities, as his policies were based on Sunni Hanafi interpretations of Islamic law and did not align with Shia jurisprudence. The successive development led to Sunni clerics perceiving Shia resistance as evidence of growing political power. This sharpened sectarian identities, made Shiites a religious target and marginalised them in state policies.
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 became a support system for Shiites who were increasingly dominated by the majority Sunni community. Some Shiite organisations in Pakistan became assertive and politically active, triggering alarm among the Sunni population that enjoyed the backing of the state. Later, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet and the US and a greater influence of Saudi Arabia fuelled Sunni militancy, especially, through Deobandi and Wahhabi-influenced teachings.
Islamabad played an active role in fuelling militancy in Afghanistan for over two decades, and ultimately ended up creating radical Islamist forces that are now out of its control. So, the state of Pakistan bears significant responsibility for the growing sectarian hatred and violence among different Muslim communities in the country.
International Crisis Group (ICG) asserted that the Shiite community felt increasing beleaguered and in danger due to the threats from Sunni Islamists. “If they had their way, ultra-orthodox Sunni groups in Pakistan would extend blasphemy provisions to cover Shia expressions of faith and interpretations of Islamic history,” it said. “As long as these groups have civic space to propagate sectarian hatred, they will thrive. The state’s failure also to prosecute those responsible for sectarian attacks is feeding into a permissive legal environment.”
Pakistan resorts to banning social media during Muharram and a few other religious events to prevent hatred and sectarian violence. The practice of mass shutdowns of the internet or social media has been rejected as a plausible method of ensuring peace, as it only strengthens hatemongers and radical Islamists in the country and becomes a weapon to repress those who are not in the government’s good book.
The Islamabad government’s record in protecting Muslim minorities from sectarian violence has been poor. Not only has it failed to rein in hardliner groups but it has also often seen responding late after the attack and failing to prosecute miscreants. Why the successive governments in Pakistan have preferred reactive security deployments and temporary crackdowns may find answers in their pro-Sunni policies.
Despite Muharram procession often becoming targets of violence from Sunni extremists, no concrete and meaningful action could be seen to be taken for decades, possibly for political and socio-religious reasons. But it did allow extremism and violence against Muslim minorities to grow over the years. The conclusion is that formation of exclusive country for Muslims did not automatically translate into peaceful living for them. Rather many of them ended up becoming vicious targets of one majority community.