A US bombing campaign against Iranian proxies, which hit more than 85 targets in response to a recent drone attack in Jordan that killed three Americans and injured dozens, threatens a regional conflagration. This crisis began after the Houthi attacks out of Yemen on commercial shipping in the Red Sea disrupted the supply chain, raised maritime insurance and transport costs, and threatened a global recession.
Amidst the deluge of international condemnation, one actor’s silence speaks volumes: China’s. Outwardly, China and President Xi Jinping are putting on an excellent poker face. However, this cannot hide China’s unenviable dilemma: its ambitions for global leadership require expanding influence in the Middle East, while simultaneously China’s economy and the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party are threatened by Iran’s truculence.
Iran, the Houthi’s patron, has long had close ties with China, shown recently by China brokering Saudi-Iranian normalization and Iran’s admission into the China-led BRICS coalition. Even as Iran has been sanctioned by the US, China, like Russia, hosts Iranian leadership, and a Chinese proclamation stated that Beijing would “participate constructively” in Tehran’s nuclear program. When Iranian protests surged, China issued a statement of opposition against “external forces interfering in Iran’s internal affairs.”
The whole-hearted past Chinese support of Teheran is withering now, Iranian proxies are being bombed, and Iran is openly proclaiming it is unafraid of war with the US. On the Houthis, China’s Foreign Ministry has only officially stated that “all relevant parties” should “avoid fanning flames”–– pointedly avoiding their usual critiques of the West’s “hegemonic bullying” practices.
All statements from China’s foreign ministry concerning the situation in Yemen have been similarly non-committal, with at the time of publishing, no detailed statement from China’s Foreign Ministry concerning economic or political dangers from the Yemen crisis or US strikes on Iran.
These platitudes not only contradict Beijing’s own past sentiments but also its recent sense of commitment to Teheran. Any attempt at establishing a “no limits partnership” between these two states has always been futile––and Xi has likely long been aware of this.
Despite its hostility to the US, China does not benefit from high-level violence and instability that may upset the global economic apple cart. Beijing seeks to remold and capture the system intact. In contrast, Teheran believes it cannot advance its agenda with the current status quo and understands it is too weak to be a peer competitor to the U.S. and the West. Teheran must resort to asymmetrical violence to achieve its political objectives, something that can derail China’s rise.
Xi previously navigated this strategic conflict by mastering the art of deflection and strategic ambiguity, employing any tactic that allows him to reap the benefits of collaboration without compromising long-term economic and security goals––and his response to the recent US strikes and the Houthis’ attacks is no exception.
As this crisis progresses, we should not expect Beijing to decisively condemn Iran for its potential role in aiding Houthi attacks, but neither should we anticipate China being a fundamental obstacle in resolving the crisis. Xi already knows how bad a protracted conflict could become, especially with the liquidation of China’s Evergrande casting doubt on China’s economy.
Despite these economic woes, however, for China, the political benefits of appearing neutral outweigh the threat of higher energy prices, especially since it anticipates the West will solve the crisis for them. If the West wishes to secure any Chinese assistance in mitigating the Red Sea crisis, Washington will have to offer a political incentive for Beijing to renege on its commitments to Iran, actively compelling them to cooperate. This is easier said than done.
The US can raise the cost of China’s silence by worsening the crisis and letting the economic impact catch up to Beijing. This is incredibly risky. Given the sheer size, scale, and reach of China’s economy, not to mention Xi’s political resolve, it could take months before the losses of Red Sea trade routes create costs that surpass what Beijing is willing to bear––by which point the crisis may have already spiraled into an all-out international war. Such an unlikely scenario would also demand the United States adopt a strategy that compromises its reputation as a guarantor of free and open trade and demands domestic sacrifices in an election year, something that would be deadly for Joe Biden politically.
The U.S. cannot afford inaction against Iran and the Houthis, even if it means inadvertently helping the Chinese economy.
And here is a long-shot idea: the US should publicly invite China to participate in anti-Houthi operations in Yemen. China would almost certainly refuse, but there is nothing wrong with inviting a trade competitor to cooperate in the name of protecting international freedom of navigation. China’s military base close in Djibouti would certainly make the operation logistically feasible, and its acceptance would show China as a responsible international partner, while potentially driving a wedge between Teheran and Beijing.
China may be already nearing the limit of what it is willing to sacrifice to maintain positive relations with Iran. Iranian sources claim that China has already upped the intensity of its stance against the Houthis. The escalating conflict in the Middle East exposes China as a strategic novice in the region and highlights the inherent conflict it is facing between economic and geopolitical interests.
forbes.com