In the high-stakes world of the international arms trade, China has emerged as a major player, positioning itself as an affordable alternative to Western defense suppliers. However, beneath the image of cost-effective military solutions lies a reality of systemic quality failures that leave purchasing nations with unreliable equipment, depleted defense budgets, and compromised national security. Bangladesh’s experience serves as a cautionary tale, highlighting the risks faced by countries engaging with Chinese military procurement. Since signing a comprehensive Defense Cooperation Agreement with China in 2002, Bangladesh has become deeply entangled in Beijing’s military-industrial network, with nearly 86% of its military imports sourced from China. This growing dependency, however, has come at a steep cost, as all three branches of Bangladesh’s armed forces have reported significant problems with Chinese equipment.
The Bangladesh Navy’s experience exemplifies the ongoing quality crisis. Two Chinese-made frigates, *BNS Umar Farooq* and *BNS Abu Ubaidah*, arrived at Mongla Port in 2020 with multiple defects, including non-functional navigation radar and gun systems. Rather than fulfilling warranty obligations, Chinese suppliers demanded additional payments for repairs, turning what seemed like bargain purchases into financial burdens. Similarly, the C704 system installed on the warship *BNS Nirmul* developed issues, with Chinese suppliers only agreeing to upgrade the system at an extra cost after repeated complaints. In perhaps the most egregious example of China’s predatory defense sales practices, Beijing sold two refurbished Ming-class submarines to Bangladesh for just over $100 million each. What initially appeared to be a significant discount was later revealed to be a deception when Dhaka discovered that the submarines were obsolete, having long outlived their utility. Repeated requests to Beijing for assistance went unanswered, leaving Bangladesh with expensive underwater relics rather than functional military assets.
The Bangladesh Air Force (BAF) has faced similar disappointments. After procuring nine K-8W aircraft in 2014-15, one was lost in a tragic crash near Jassore airport in July 2018. The BAF ordered seven additional K-8W aircraft, but two developed issues almost immediately after delivery in October 2020. More concerning still, the BAF struggled to fire ammunition from these aircraft— a fundamental function for any military plane. Even basic trainer aircraft, like the Diamond DA-40, procured from China, arrived with operational snags in various control systems. The army hasn’t fared better. Chinese-made MBT-2000 tanks purchased by the Bangladesh Army have been plagued by spare parts shortages, rendering them unreliable in combat scenarios. In 2022, the Bangladesh Army expressed dissatisfaction with China North Industries Corporation (Norinco)’s supply of tank ammunition, rejecting it as untested. The Chinese-supplied Multi Launch Rocket System (MLRS) units have been so problematic that Bangladesh is planning to replace them with Turkish-made alternatives.
This pattern of quality failures isn’t unique to Bangladesh. Countries such as Nigeria, Myanmar, and Pakistan report similar issues with Chinese military equipment. Nigeria’s military, for example, encountered numerous technical problems with Chinese-made F-7 aircraft delivered starting in 2009, with several lost in crashes. By 2020, seven of the remaining aircraft had to be sent back to China for extensive repairs. Myanmar found that Chinese-made radar on its JF-17 aircraft lacked accuracy and had limited capabilities, such as the inability to engage beyond-visual-range missiles or intercept airborne threats. Pakistan, despite being China’s largest arms customer, has expressed dissatisfaction with Chinese-produced F-22P frigates, citing technical problems, engine degradation, and poor overall performance. The FM90 (N) missile system purchased by Pakistan suffered from a defective infrared sensor system, rendering it unable to lock onto targets. The defective IR17 sensors had to be discarded completely— a costly and dangerous outcome for a critical defense system.
China’s strategy in military exports becomes increasingly clear: attract customers with cut-rate pricing and financing, while obscuring the hidden costs that arise when equipment malfunctions. These costs extend beyond financial burdens. Many of the recipient nations lack personnel with the expertise to resolve issues with Chinese equipment and struggle to acquire replacement parts. The technological incompatibility of Chinese military equipment compounds these challenges, creating dependency while providing substandard capabilities. Most troublingly, Chinese suppliers have shown little accountability for maintenance or repair, forcing some countries to seek assistance from third parties. Myanmar, for instance, turned to Pakistani technicians to address technical problems with its JF-17 aircraft. These delays significantly slow down recipient countries’ military modernization timelines and compromise defense readiness.
China primarily targets developing countries in South Asia and Africa, offering arms deals with few political contingencies. Nations concerned about their human rights records, financial credibility, or regime stability may find themselves excluded from Western arms suppliers, but China presents itself as a reliable alternative. Beijing has positioned itself as a key player in the “value arms” market, selling light training aircraft, fighter jets, armored personnel carriers, and unmanned aerial vehicles that meet minimum functionality criteria for countries engaged in counterterrorism operations or fighting insurgent groups. However, the reputation for substandard quality is beginning to catch up with China. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, China’s arms exports dropped by 23% from 2013–17 to 2018–22.
This decline has continued, with Chinese arms exports falling by 5.3% during the 2019-23 period compared to 2014-18. In contrast, the United States saw a 17% increase in arms exports during the same timeframe, while France experienced a remarkable 47% growth. China’s decline in the arms export market reveals a fundamental weakness in its military-industrial complex: an emphasis on perception management rather than battlefield-tested effectiveness. China’s military-industrial complex churns out advanced-looking weapons systems with meticulously orchestrated unveilings, but their performance rarely matches the propaganda. The country remains dependent on Russia for high-tech weaponry, accounting for 21% of Russia’s arms exports. The eight Chinese companies in the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s list of the top 100 arms producers generated $108 billion in arms revenue, giving them the second-largest share behind US companies, yet their products continue to disappoint on the global stage.
As more nations experience the frustrations of dealing with defective Chinese military equipment and the burdensome aftermath, Beijing’s strategy of flooding smaller nations with substandard weapons may be reaching its limits. Countries like Bangladesh are increasingly seeking to diversify their defense procurement, turning to suppliers from India, Europe, and the United States, despite the higher upfront costs. (Ankit K – Institute – Asst Professor in International Relations, National Defence University