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Σάββατο, 14 Δεκεμβρίου, 2024

Pakistan and Central Asian Region – A Chronicle of Conflicting Interests

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Pakistan’s security establishment has been increasingly focusing on a “Vision Central Asia” strategy, aiming to enhance its defence ties with the five Central Asia Region (CAR) countries, of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Pakistan has been involved in training and equipping Central Asian military forces. This includes providing military hardware and conducting joint military exercises to enhance interoperability and counter-terrorism efforts. Establishing defence & security cooperation has emerged as the primary thrust area, but progress on this remains limited because Central Asian nations are wary of Pakistan’s support for certain militant groups and a historical trust deficit. 

Military diplomacy and increase in visits to the region by senior military officials have built on the momentum generated by high level political engagements. There have been several high-level visits between Pakistan and Central Asian countries, resulting in defence agreements. Pakistan’s Director General ISI visited Turkmenistan on July 10-11 and intends to visit Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the near future. Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Gen Asim Munir and Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu are scheduled to separately visit CAR countries in the coming months. Former DG ISI Lt Gen. Nadeem Anjum’s visit to Ashgabatfrom July 10-11 served to assure Turkmenistan that Islamabad accorded top priority to the 1735 km, 33 bcm per annum TAPI Gas Pipeline Project. Despite these interactions, there is a cautious and sometimes sceptical approach from Central Asian nations towards Pakistan’s initiatives.

Multibillion-dollar TAPI Pipeline Project Remains at a Standstill:

Media reports state that the Turkmen side impressed on COAS Munir the need to push for amendments to Pak domestic laws as per TAPI Gas Pipeline related agreements to expedite implementation of the project. Both sides are also considering a gas swap agreement via Iran and counter any possible US objections by citing similar gas swap agreements with Iraq, Azerbaijan and Turkey. Ashgabat requested Pakistan’s National Logistics Corporation to set up a logistic hub at Serhetabat for container storage, warehousing and cross docking import / export consignment to and from Karachi and Gwadar ports and Port Qasim. Despite these ongoing talks to address these issues and move the Turkmenistan – Afghanistan – Pakistan – India (TAPI) pipeline project forward, there are several challenges that Islamabad has been unable to address over the years. The project has encountered financial difficulties, including securing adequate funding and managing the logistics of such a large-scale infrastructure project.There have been disagreements over gas tariffs and project costs between Pakistan and Turkmenistan, leading to a lack of progress. 

The volatile political and security situation in Pakistan has been a significant challenge, impacting the construction and operational phases of the pipeline. For instance, The TAPI project faced challenges during the previous government, when the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government requested a revision of gas tariffs for Pakistan’s export share under the project. Turkmenistan declined, citing concerns that fulfilling Pakistan’s demand would trigger similar requests from India and Afghanistan.

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Now, despite the change in government, Pakistan’s demands remain unchanged. Sharif’s government too has called for a reduction in gas tariffs based on its claims of importing liquefied natural gas (LNG) at cheaper rates. 

So, even as  Pakistan’s reliance on imported LNG exceeds 20%, the deadlock over TAPI persists. Islamabad’s unwavering stance on the tariffs implies that the future  of this ambitious regional energy project hangs in the balance.

With Central Asian Countries Pakistan’s Cooperation is Confined to Sale of Outdated Military Equipment:

Sale of military equipment to Azerbaijan has yielded a rich dividend for Islamabad. in 2019 Baku purchased ten Super Mushak aircrafts and in September 2024, agreed to purchase twelve JF-17C and three JF-17B aircrafts. Azeri State Security Service, ISI and Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) have forged cooperation under the ‘VATAN’ platform on CT/Counter Violent Extremism (CVE). So, while on the face of it Pakistan and Azerbaijan have a degree of defence cooperation, there have been some hurdles and challenges in their relationship. To a large extent this defence cooperation is confined to sale and purchase of military equipment . 

However, financial limitations and the cost of defence projects has posed challenges to the implementation of joint initiatives. Security threats in Pakistan, including terrorism and instability, have impacted the progress of defence cooperation. On the other hand, tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia have also complicated their defence cooperation. The reality of the evolving geopolitics and conflicting interests in Asia is that Pakistan and Azerbaijan have not really been able to balance their relationship, beyond defence equipment sales. 

Azerbaijan has been facing issues with regards to the basic trainer aircraft Super Mushak, also known as the PAC MFI-395 Super Mushshak sold by Pakistan. The Super Mushak is prone to technical faults leading to crashes. Pakistan has also failed to provide consistent maintenance and availability of spare parts to Baku for the same. While the Super Mushak is effective for basic training, its capabilities are limited compared to more advanced trainer aircraft, which can impact its utility in more complex training scenarios. Baku must seriously reconsider the probable purchase of the JF-17 Thunder aircraft, developed jointly by Pakistan and China. There have been reports of structural flaws, including cracks in the vertical stabiliser and other parts of the aircraft. The aircraft’s avionics, including the Chinese-made KLJ-7 Al radar, have been criticised for poor accuracy and maintenance issues. The lack of an effective beyond-visual-range (BVR) missile or airborne interception radar has also been a concern. High maintenance requirements and poor serviceability have been reported, making it difficult to keep the aircraft operational.

Differences with Uzbekistan over Support for Taliban Government:

Despite the fact that Pakistan and Uzbekistan have historically had strained relations due to their differing support for Afghan factions during the Soviet-Afghan War, Pakistan is keen to increase defence cooperation with Uzbekistan. In this context as well, Islamabad has been pushing for the sale of five Super Mushak aircrafts having already supplied one to Tashkent in July on gratis basis. However, Tashkent continues to scan the international arms market and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev inspected KAAN 5th generation Turkish aircraft

 Uzbekistan’s engagement with the Taliban is a sore point with Pakistan. Tashkent is also finalising an agreement to establish/develop military intelligence cooperation, particularly regarding terror organisations and threat perception in Central and South Asia. The fact that Tashkent has sought to serve as a broker between the Taliban and the international community, aiming to keep Afghanistan on the global agenda and promote regional stability has created differences with Islamabad, which has shifted its policy towards isolating the Taliban. Despite the challenges and criticisms from Pakistan, Uzbekistan continues to engage with the Taliban, focusing on projects like the trans-Afghan railway to enhance regional connectivity and economic cooperation. 

For Pakistan Uzbekistan threats also arise from the foreign militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) which operates from Pakistani territory in North Waziristan. Pushed out of Central Asia to Afghanistan in the late 1990s, the IMU has since reinvented itself with a foothold in Pakistan’s tribal areas and the Afghan north close to the borders of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Pakistan has always been a safe haven for Uzbek militants, and  in South Waziristan, the IMU’s leader Tahir Yuldashev was “a star speaker” in local mosques. The IMU’s recruitment base expanded from Central Asians – Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kyrgyz – to other nationalities, including Arabs, Afghans, Uighurs, Chechens and some Westerners, all of whom have found safe sanctuary in Pakistan’s tribal belt in the north-western areas. 

Similarly a trust deficit between Pakistan and Tajikistan primarily stems from regional security concerns and historical geopolitical dynamics. Pakistan’s historical support for the Taliban has been a point of contention with Tajikistan. Differences in economic policies and political stances have also contributed to the trust deficit, with both countries navigating their own strategic interests in the region. While Pakistan claims to have taken steps to restrain some militant groups, it has been accused of not dismantling all terrorist organisations without discrimination. This selective approach has led to scepticism about its commitment to genuinely combating terrorism. Unless Pakistan is able to address this glaring security threat and breach of trust, it may be difficult for the CAR nations to proceed towards security cooperation beyond token gestures. Pakistan’s perceived dual role in supporting and opposing the Taliban, has created mistrust among Central Asian countries.

Pakistan is trying to leverage Islam to strengthen ties with Central Asian nations. This strategy is part of a broader effort to enhance regional cooperation and counterbalance India’s influence in the region. 

But if recent incidents are anything to go by, this approach has its limitations. For instance, Pakistan and Kyrgyzstan have faced some challenges in their relationship, particularly concerning the safety of Pakistani students in Kyrgyzstan. In May this year, violent mobs targeted hostels housing Pakistanis in Bishkek and the incident has strained relations between the two countries. Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif voiced concern on Twitter about “the situation of Pakistani students in Bishkek” and instructed the country’s ambassador to provide assistance to the victims. Pakistani authorities also organised charter flights to ferry home any student who felt it would be unsafe to continue studying in Bishkek. 540 Pakistani students in Kyrgyzstan had opted to return home. So although Pakistan is trying to use the islamic card to establish closer relations with CAR nations,  there are indications that resentments among Kyrgyz are building over the perception that cheap Pakistani labour is displacing local workers in some sectors of the economy.

As far as trade goes, the list of impediments to improved trade between Pakistan and the CAR is long and range from the existential e.g., security in Pakistan  to the mundane e.g., delayed release of Letters of Credit. The absence of correspondent banking ties between CAR and Pakistan is the most immediate issue. Almost all exporters and importers have expressed concerns about the difficulty of getting recognition from banks for their trade documentation, which is directly tied to the absence of correspondent banking relationships. Insurance for goods transiting from Pakistan to Central Asia is essentially unavailable. 

CAR nations are cautious about Pakistan’s economic ambitions, particularly its efforts to become a regional trade hub through initiatives like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). CAR nations are circumspect about the CPEC that is being pushed by Pakistan as an essential step towards connectivity with the region. CPEC is a Chinese initiative under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and does not formulate a dedicated policy towards Central Asia by Pakistan. In fact Islamabad is merely pursuing a disconnected set of initiatives across different projects, failing to act on the original TAPI. 

Overall Central Asian nations have shown a lukewarm response to Pakistan’s overtures for several reasons. Central Asian nations are wary of Pakistan’s alleged support for certain militant groups, which complicates their willingness to fully engage with Pakistan. So despite showing interest in purchase of a few Pakistani military equipment, Central Asian nations have a cautious and sometimes sceptical approach towards Pakistan’s overtures. 

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