The devastating suicide bombing at the Khadija-tul-Kubra mosque in Islamabad on February 6, 2026, which claimed 32 lives and left nearly 170 injured, serves as a grim indictment of a security policy that has long prioritized geopolitical leverage over domestic stability.
While the Pakistani establishment has characteristically pivoted toward a carousel of external culprits—alternating between allegations of an “Indian link,” Afghan complicity, and even the internal machinations of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)—the international consensus among regional experts is coalescing around a more uncomfortable truth.
The blast is not an isolated intrusion of foreign malice but the predictable harvest of a “nurture-and-neglect” strategy toward extremism that dates back decades. Since its inception, the Pakistani military establishment has viewed militant proxies as instruments of “strategic depth.” From the mobilization of tribal militias to invade Kashmir in October 1947 to the institutionalization of the Kashmir insurgency in the 1990s, the state has consistently traded long-term security for short-term tactical disruption.
This legacy of patronage is most visible in the continued survival of UN-designated terrorist entities like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). Despite international pressure and the FATF gray-listing eras, the “deep state” has rarely moved beyond cosmetic crackdowns, often providing high-profile shelter to leaders like Hafiz Saeed and Masood Azhar under the guise of “protective custody.”
The Rawalkot Revelation: Patronage in Plain Sight
The most damning evidence of this ongoing nexus surfaced just days before the Islamabad tragedy. In Rawalkot, located in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), Jaish-e-Mohammed held a high-profile public rally that functioned with the transparent cooperation of the Pakistani security apparatus.
During the event, senior Jaish commander Ilyas Kashmiri reportedly addressed a crowd, invoking the rhetoric of “Ghazwa-e-Hind” and suggesting that Army Chief General Asim Munir viewed the current confrontation with India as a holy war.
This was not a clandestine meeting in a remote cave; it was a choreographed display of strength in an area where the military maintains total control.
Analytical pieces by Western and Indian observers, such as those from the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), note that while “Operation Sindoor”—India’s 2025 response to the Pahalgam attacks—temporarily disrupted terror infrastructure, the Pakistani establishment has already begun funding the reconstruction of these facilities.
Reports indicate an initial disbursement of PKR 4 crore to LeT for “flood relief,” a euphemism for rebuilding command-and-neck centers.
When a state provides the financial and physical space for groups like JeM to recruit and fundraise in Rawalkot, it forfeits the right to express surprise when the same radicalization infrastructure eventually turns its sights inward.
The Shia Outcry: From Complicity to Internal Collapse
The blowback of this policy has created a fractured society where the distinction between “good” and “bad” militants has completely dissolved.
In the wake of the Islamabad Mosque blast, a viral video captured a prominent Shia scholar publicly berating Pakistani army officers. His words—vicious, raw, and unyielding—echoed a growing sentiment among Pakistan’s marginalized communities.
He accused the military of “nurturing Takfiris and ISIS” as strategic tools, only to see those same forces “eliminating generations” of Pakistani Shia.
This public confrontation represents a critical break in the national narrative. For decades, the “ghairat” (honor) of the military was the glue holding the state together. Now, that glue is failing.
International analysts like Michael Kugelman and Abdul Sayed have pointed out that groups like Islamic State-Pakistan Province (ISPP) and the TTP often draw their foot soldiers from the very sectarian networks that the state previously tolerated to counter Indian influence or maintain domestic control.
By allowing extremist ideologies to flourish in madrassas and public rallies, the establishment has created a monster that no longer recognizes its master.
The Myth of the Foreign Hand
The Pakistani defense ministry’s immediate attempt to link the February 6th blast to India or the Afghan Taliban is increasingly viewed by the global community as a diversionary tactic.
As noted by Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokespersons and regional commentators, the “foreign hand” theory is a tired script intended to mask systemic internal failure.
Even domestic critics like Maulana Fazlur Rehman have pointed out the absurdity of the state’s claims, noting that if the borders are secure enough to stop trade, they should be secure enough to stop militants—unless the militants are already inside.
The reality is that Pakistan is currently fighting a multi-front war of its own making. It blames the Afghan Taliban for sheltering the TTP, yet it was the Pakistani establishment that celebrated the Taliban’s return to Kabul in 2021 as a victory for “strategic depth.”
It blames the PTI for domestic unrest, yet it has used the security apparatus to manipulate the political landscape to the point of paralysis. The Islamabad blast is the latest data point in a downward spiral where the state’s obsession with regional proxies has left its own capital vulnerable to the very “Takfiri” elements it once considered useful.
The Islamabad Mosque bombing is a reminder that “strategic depth” is a hollow concept when the state cannot secure its own federal capital. Until the Pakistani establishment stops viewing militants as “assets” and begins treating them as the existential threats they are, the cycle of violence will continue.
The blood on the carpets of the Khadija-tul-Kubra Mosque is not just the result of a security lapse; it is the inevitable outcome of a century-long policy of flirting with the fire of extremism.