Pakistan, with its historical record of state-sponsorship of cross-border terrorism and years-old policy of Islamisation of social and political affairs, is ‘reaping the bitter fruits’ of past actions. During the last two decades, Islamabad had an unprecedented opportunity to break with the unfortunate patterns of the past. Pakistan’s establishment had a window of opportunity to cease instrumentalizing Jihadism as a foreign policy tool – to end the use of extreme Islamist elements as a form of influence over domestic political trajectories, and to normalize its relations with India. Indeed Islamabad had a chance to put its own house in order,[1] for instance through the improvement of unhealthy civil-military relations, the reversal of centralised repression over the nation’s regions, the protection of religious-ethnic minorities, or the pushing of sustainable economic development, among others. Yet Pakistan’s leadership instead decided to maintain its support for the Taliban in its fight against both the US and its NATO allies, which led to the reestablishment of a theocratic terrorist regime in Kabul – celebrated at the time by Islamabad as a ‘strategic victory’. Today, Islamabad is confronted with the repercussions of the undermining of “western efforts” to bring peace and stability, not only to Afghanistan, but to the whole region as well.
Two crucial points should be stressed here: Firstly, the currently worsening security situation in Pakistan is not the result of the fault-lines in governance during the last few years, especially under the administration of former Prime Minister Imran Khan.[2] Instead, it is the result of the ‘multiple lost opportunities and policy blunders’ by both military and civilian leaderships since the country came into existence.
Secondly, besides a vague notion of gaining ‘strategic depth’ in its western neighbourhood through a Taliban rule, and/or besides exporting terrorism, Pakistan had no comprehensive Afghanistan policy. This is why Pakistan was apparently ‘operating on the assumption that the Taliban would be beholden to Pakistan out of gratitude for years of support’. Concretely, there was the perception among Pakistani security circles that the ties, especially the military alliance,[3] between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan Taliban (or Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan/TTP) ‘would gradually weaken’ – and that the new rulers in Kabul would take concrete action against the TTP and other anti-Pakistan elements on Afghan soil. However, the Taliban regime ‘remained non-committal on a crackdown on the TTP despite repeated calls’ from Islamabad. Against Islamabad’s expectations, numerous TTP field commanders and fighters were freed after the Afghan Taliban captured the capital.
Pakistan’s approach towards the Afghan Taliban failed since Islamabad’s objectives in Afghanistan were not attained – much the opposite, we now witness the destabilization of Pakistan itself. This is astonishing, since Islamabad had as previous experience that the former Taliban regime (1996-2001) also did not respond positively to Pakistani demands, foremost the recognition of the Durand Line as an international border and the hoped-for decisive measures against anti-Pakistani groups residing on Afghan soil.
Domestic experts often argue that the country’s military and intelligence were ‘blinded by their obsession with India’. The unwarranted paranoiac fear of “strategic encirclement” by a hostile New Delhi and an Indian-friendly Kabul is deeply entrenched in national defense and security considerations by Pakistani decision-makers. Perhaps that is why they ignore the fact that it was under the former Afghan government of Ashraf Ghani (and due to NATO/US presence) that TTP fighters were killed – or arrested, only to be freed by the Afghan Taliban. Moreover, said Afghan Taliban are providing political and military support to the TTP so that the group can achieve its objectives[4] inside Pakistan.[5] Here, it is even reported that the Afghan Taliban are covertly encouraging the TTP. The Afghan Taliban’s victory ‘rejuvenated the TTP and offered it greater operational freedom in Afghanistan’. It became clear that the bonds – based on the same ideological mind set, family ties, and shared interests – between the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban are stronger than any “feeling of gratitude” from the Afghan Taliban towards its sponsors in Islamabad. In other words, Pakistan ignored the Afghan Taliban’s position regarding the TPP, which fundamentally different from Islamabad’s.
In this context, it’s crucial to highlight that Islamabad assumed the Afghan Taliban’s foreign policy to have significant ‘limitations in the broader geostrategic and geo-economic contexts’. In other words, it was not expected by Pakistan that the Taliban would develop an independent foreign policy, let alone one compromising Islamabad’s core objectives. It will be most interesting to monitor the Afghan Taliban’s future stands regarding India. The latest signals from Kabul indicate that there is a willingness to reassess and improve their traditionally hostile behaviour vis-à-vis New Delhi and work towards improving bilateral ties. Facing an existential economic crisis and increasing anger among the Afghan citizenry, it seems that the Taliban leadership is realising ‘that they cannot continue to keep all their eggs in the Pakistani basket.’ The strong ‘anti-Pakistan constituency’ also stands in contrast to India’s ‘earned good will’ among the Afghan society.
It does not come by surprise that Pakistan’s security challenges are once again piling up. The year 2022 ended with the deadliest month[6] for Pakistan’s’ security forces in over a decade. Most noteworthily, since the takeover of Afghanistan by the Afghan Taliban, Pakistan experienced an ‘over 50 per cent rise’ in terror attacks[7] – a significant number of which were claimed by the TTP. Consequently, the notion that the ‘TTP would become more reconciliatory’, willing to truly negotiate a peace process, and would lay down their arms after their ‘brothers-in-arms’ had achieved victory in Afghanistan turned out to be wishful thinking at the best. Today, the TTP not only launched a new, large-scale terror campaign, but is also successfully recruiting new members on Pakistani soil. That the TTP not only rejects the Pakistani constitution but also appointed its own government for the border areas as a challenge to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country means nothing less than that it aims for the capitulation of the Pakistani state and its institutions.
Reminding ourselves of the statement by Imran Khan, then Pakistan’s PM, praising the seizing of power by the Afghan Taliban for breaking the ‘shackles of slavery’, one wonders who broke which ‘shackles’. In sum, the two Taliban groupings remain undivided; on the other hand, the cracks in the Pakistan-Afghan Taliban ties are rapidly widening. Observers are even assuming that the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan are at the brink of war – pointing towards a grim forecast for 2023.
sadf.eu