Since at least 11 February, Australia and New Zealand have been tracking a group of People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships, referred to as Task Force 107 by the Australian Department of Defence, near Australia. Using a variety of sources from Australia and New Zealand, Naval News has attempted to piece together a timeline of their circumnavigation of Australia. The public was first made aware of the Chinese task force on 13 February when the Australian Department of Defence publicised its presence near Australia and released imagery of Type 054A frigate Hengyang transiting the Torres Strait between Australia and Papua New Guinea on 11 February.
Story by Alex Luck with Timeline by Ben Felton.
The other two ships in the force, Type 055 cruiser Zunyi and Type 903 oilier Weishanhu, transited to the north of Papua New Guinea on or around the same date. They then moved into the Coral Sea, where Weishanhu rendezvoused with Hengyang on either 13 or 14 February while Zunyi remained further to the North.
On 15 February, Australia released imagery showing Anzac class frigate HMAS Arunta shadowing both Weishanhu and Hengyang somewhere in the Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand. Metadata extracted from that imagery indicates that it was taken on the afternoon of 15 February.
Timeline of Events:
- 11 February – Hengyang transits Torres Strait.
- 12 February – Zunyi and Weishanhu conduct a replenishment at sea.
- 13-14 February – Hengyang and Weishanhu rendezvous in the Coral Sea while Zunyi remains further North.
- 15 February – HMAS Arunta observes Hengyang and Weishanhu in the Coral Sea.
- 21 February – Task Force 107 completes live fire exercise which is observed by HMNZS Te Kaha.
- 22 February – All three ships completed another live-fire exercise which is again observed by HMNZS Te Kaha.
- 26 February – Task Force 107 enters the Great Australian Bight.
- 5 March – Task Force 107 passes Perth heading North.
Arunta appears to have stopped shadowing the Task Force somewhere between 15 February and 21 February as, by the morning of 21 February when the Task Force completed its first live-fire exercise, HMNZS Te Kaha was the only vessel shadowing the group.
On 22 February, the group which by then included all three vessels, conducted another live-fire exercise which was observed by the crew of HMNZS Te Kaha.
By 24 February, the NZDF reported the group’s position as being 280 nautical miles east of Tasmania outside of Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Over the following days, it moved Southwest around Tasmania, with the Australian Department of Defence reporting that the Task Force re-entered Australia’s EEZ on the morning of 25 February before entering the Great Australian Bight on 26 February.
The Australian frigate HMAS Stuart appears to have commenced monitoring the task group somewhere around 24 February, with the RNZN tanker HMNZS Aotearoa conducting an underway replenishment with the frigate in that time frame. A second replenishment at sea took place on 26 February according to photo metadata.
By 27 February, the Australian Minister for Defence, Richard Marles, said that HMAS Stuart was shadowing the group through the Great Australian Bight.
The Task Force continued West through the Great Australian Bight before rounding Cape Leeuwin (Western Australia’s Southernmost point) sometime before 5 March. On 5 March , Marles said that the group was being shadowed by HMAS Stuart, HMAS Warramunga and HMAS Toowoomba around 300 nautical miles North West of Perth where they continued to move up the Australian coast.
As of Friday, March 7, Australia reported that the the Chinese Task Force was 420 nautical miles south of Christmas Island. The vessels may pass through the Sunda Strait into the Java Sea, before continuing into the South China Sea.
Naval News-analysis
The cruise of the Chinese task force has attracted considerable media and government attention in Australia and New Zealand. Official statements by both countries echoed the general assessment that the task force had operated in line with international law, including where notifications regarding live fire-drills were concerned.
Mystery drone sighting in vicinity of Chinese frigate
The cruise along the course outlined by Naval News above had for the most part been an uneventful affair. The first major exception was local sighting of an as of yet unidentified aircraft or drone, when Type 054A FFG 568 Hengyang transited the Torres Strait between Papua New Guinea and Australia around February 11. The second instance were the live fire drills later in the Tasman Sea on February 21. The aircraft or drone sighted on February 11 in PNG national airspace remains perhaps the most mysterious aspect. As of this writing the nature and identity of the aircraft in question remain unconfirmed. Observers were quick to point to Hengyang having launched a drone as the culprit, but this explanation remains entirely speculative.
Type 054A frigates are typically embarking a single Z-9 light helicopter for utility and ASW-roles. The Chinese Navy is known to experiment with VTOL drones for use with a variety of platforms. Use is prominent especially from amphibious hulls and to a limited degree from aircraft carriers. Most relevant may be trials from a Type 054A FFG more than ten years ago involving the Austrian-made Schiebel S-100 Camcopter. Additionally Chinese warships in exercises launch fixed wing target drones from their helicopter pads. However, neither precedent seems to explain the nature or circumstances involving the unknown aircraft flying in PNG airspace.
Live fire-drills and questions over submarine-presence
The live fire-drills, according to imagery published by Chinese state media, involved the use of naval guns. The footage did not show any missile launches. Both Zunyi and Hengyang utilised their 30 mm air defence guns. At least Zunyi also fired her 130 mm main gun. The limited footage released showed all guns firing at very low elevation, presumably simulating surface and low altitude aerial targets. This kind of gunnery practice would not present a hazard to high-flying commercial air traffic. Interestingly PLAN conducted these live fire drills in international waters outside the Australian EEZ. China is one of several countries objecting to drills conducted in national EEZs without consent of the local state. Accepted practice under UNCLOS does not require state permission for live fire drills within national EEZs. Other navies including the US Navy routinely engage in exercises accordingly.
The final question of the Chinese deployment concerns speculation regarding the presence of a PLAN submarine. Only nuclear-powered submarines would be capable of participating in such a cruise, considering the distances and absence of port calls. Australia P-8A appeared to have dropped sonobuoys during the early stages of the task force approaching Australia. Neither Australian nor New Zealand officials have confirmed or definitely ruled out the presence of a Chinese submarine.
Admiral David Johnston, Chief of the Defence Force, in a Senates Estimates-session on February 26, responded to a related question: “I don’t know whether there is a submarine with them. It is possible. Task groups occasionally do deploy with submarines, but not always, so I can’t be definitive on whether that’s the case.” As a matter of precedence Chinese SSNs still rarely venture outside the immediate surroundings of the Chinese mainland, with a focus to the east. Activities most often appear to focus on the South and East China Seas. However PLAN has repeatedly deployed a Type 09III SSN to the Indian Ocean. Such operations date back to 2013, then causing somewhat of a stir particularly in Indian defence circles. Considering current modernisation and expansion of the Chinese submarine fleet, further ventures abroad would be one logical operational consequence.
In summary the Chinese Task Force deployment around Australia, while operationally low profile and of limited significance, likely signals PRC intentions to more routinely deploy naval combatants abroad with an intention of primarily political messaging. The overall conduct and emphasis of legal entitlements under international law may serve to counteract Australian and Western efforts communicating similar naval operations near the Chinese mainland, notably in the South China Sea and around Taiwan.