The news from Pakistan is interesting. Not Shehbaz Sharif’s return as prime minister. That’s just another contrived leaf in the country’s electoral history with a rather more than usual dose of blatant interference. What is news is that Indian authorities seized a consignment of dual-use items abroad a Malta-flagged vehicle originating from China and destined for Pakistan. It seems the ‘iron brother’ remains steadfast in the area of nuclear assistance, even while its interest flags in commercial enterprises.
The report is rather limited. All that Customs authorities in Mumbai are willing to say is that two advanced Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machines manufactured by GKD, Italy and bound for the port of Karachi were seized by Indian customs at Mumbai Port. The consignment was shipped on 9 January on a merchant vessel CMA CGM Attila, a Malta-flagged vessel from Shekou Port in China, and was heading to Karachi Port with Cosmos Engineering being the consignee. Not that this was stated in the original bill of lading. That mentioned the consigner as “Shanghai JXE Global Logistics Co Ltd” and the consignee as “Pakistan Wings Pvt Ltd” of Sialkot turned out to be false. The real consignee was Cosmos Engineering which is involved in manufacturing a range of items but describes itself as a sourcing and procurement agency also. It has been in the eye of interest in the past, when it tried to acquire ‘thermo-electric instruments’ from an Italian firm, and which was also seized.
There are many more such instances, nearly all involving China. Most recently, this was apparent in October 2023 when the US announced sanctions on three Chinese companies for missile proliferation to Pakistan. What is interesting is the areas that are seeing Chinese assistance. These include razing materials, which are used to join components in ballistic missile rocket engines and in the production of combustion chambers. Beijing Luo Luo Technology Development Co Ltd supplied mandrels and other machinery for use in solid‐propellant rocket motors. Another Chinese company supplied D‐glass glass fibre, quartz fabric, and high silica cloth, all of which have applications in missile systems. In other words, core and dual-use equipment for Pakistan’s missile effort, all of which has been going on at least since the 1990’s. It’s interesting that the US sanction list doesn’t mention Pakistani entities at all. This information would have been known, certainly to Indian intel, at least in part. How many other shipments have passed without detection is unknown, given that such stray seizures are likely to be the tip of the iceberg. The question arises why the US doesn’t call out Pakistani entities involved in such transactions.
The US and its allies have long been partnering against nuclear and missile proliferation, with the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) launched in 2003, and with some 111 countries ‘endorsing’ the move which is a non-treaty based voluntary effort to interdict and share information on any proliferation activities. Sri Lanka is a participant. India is not. Delhi stayed away from the PSI given the years of efforts to stop India’s own independent efforts at building a minimum nuclear deterrent. In 2016 however, India joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which also allows it access to sensitive technologies and makes it part of the non-proliferation effort.
India is also part of the Wassenaar Arrangement, which is a node for curbing industrial technology for proliferation, which is chaired last year. China is not a member of either, but claims to adhere to its guidelines. Clearly, it does not. US Congressional publications detail Chinese proliferation activities to Pakistan and others, including Beijing’s supply of civil nuclear reactors in Chashma, which is disallowed under the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to which China is a signatory. Beijing argues this is covered under an original treaty which predates its entry into NSG. Members however explicitly did not agree with this interpretation. Yet, no one objected to the signing last year for the construction of Chashma 5 by China and Pakistan.
In the past, so-called legitimate imports for its civilian nuclear reactors, often concealed parts for its nuclear weapons program. Despite all this, the position now is that the parts are being supplied not by the Chinese government, but by ‘entities’ in China. That would be reasonably understandable in a democracy. Under Beijing’s ever-increasing control, any such transhipment is impossible. Yet Beijing enjoys access to technologies of all kinds, and it is only recently that some controls have been instituted. Pakistan in effect, therefore has access to all tech available to China.
Those missile tests are expensive
Now consider another set of issues. Pakistan tested the Ababeel Medium Range ballistic missile (MRBM) in October 2023, which is assessed as aspiring to launch MIRV’s (multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles) an elite technology club that was so far limited to five countries including China, and perhaps India.
In October 2023 it tested the Ghauri MRBM for its readiness. In December it tested the Fatah -2 which is alleged to be a 400 km missile. And in March it inducted some 12 JF-17’s for its airborne nuclear-capable fleet. All that takes a lot of money. Estimates for North Korea is broadly $3 million for a short-range missile to $10 million for a long-range missile. While North Korea has been castigated for starving its people to fund its nuclear programme. Pakistan to do it justice, may not have the same indifference, but its debt and liabilities spiralled 27.2 per cent to reach Rs 81.194 trillion end of December 2023, over the same period of the previous fiscal year.
That means either that already scarce funds are being diverted to this area, or that it is receiving help from some outside source. That source has so far been only China (and to a lesser extent North Korea). It seems at the minimum, that while Beijing is now drawing back from further funding the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, it has no qualms about sustaining a hugely expensive nuclear and missile programme.
In sum, the recent seizures underline how much China uses Pakistan for its own ends, mostly to the latter’s detriment, which includes the huge debt that Islamabad is reeling under. More dangerous however is the nuclear and missile link which Pakistan wrongly sees as ‘Iron brother’s’ generosity. It is not. When it comes to the push, China will demand that Pakistan use its nuclear and missile inventory to at the very least present a two-front threat. That would be extremely unwise, given not just the muscular approach to such threats by the present government, but that it doesn’t serve its own core interests.
India-China skirmishes will continue. But both will steer clear of outright war. The US and others will use the situation for their own ends, as they have so far. In simple words, the bigger countries will continue on their usual well-trodden path. Pakistan on the other hand will teeter again on the edge. Islamabad has so far wisely refrained from such adventurism. It may not have that luxury in future.