In October 2025, China expelled nine senior generals from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), including He Weidong, the former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and Miao Hua, Director of the Political Work Department. While the official justification cited “grave duty-related crimes,” the deeper story is one of strategic consolidation, loyalty enforcement, and systemic recalibration within the armed forces.
This purge—Xi Jinping’s most sweeping yet—did not occur in isolation. It follows a decade-long pattern of removals targeting both civilian and military elites, from former Defense Minister Li Shangfu to Rocket Force commanders. The timing, just ahead of the Fourth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee, underscores its political weight: this was not merely a cleanup, but a preemptive strike to reshape the military’s internal architecture.
What makes this moment especially significant is the stature of those expelled. He Weidong was not only the PLA’s second-highest-ranking officer but also a Politburo member—placing him within the party’s elite decision-making circle. Miao Hua, a key figure in the PLA’s ideological and personnel management, had long been seen as a stabilizing force.
Their removal signals that no rank is immune, and that Xi’s vision for the PLA demands absolute alignment with his leadership. The reasons cited—corruption and personnel mismanagement—are credible and consistent with longstanding issues in the PLA. Cronyism, opaque promotions, and factional networks have plagued the military’s internal cohesion. Many of the expelled officers shared ties to the Eastern Theater Command and the former 31st Group Army, suggesting a dismantling of entrenched cliques that could challenge centralized authority.
But corruption is only part of the calculus. Xi’s purge reflects a deeper anxiety: the need for a loyal, agile, and ideologically aligned military amid rising tensions with the United States, Taiwan, and the broader Indo-Pacific. As China modernizes its military hardware—from hypersonic missiles to laser systems—the leadership appears increasingly concerned that strategic competence must be matched by political reliability. This dual imperative—modernization and loyalty—has created a paradox. While Xi seeks a world-class fighting force, he also fears the autonomy that professionalism can breed.
The result is a military that is being reshaped not just through technology, but through ideological purification. The message is clear: the PLA is not just a warfighting institution—it is a political instrument of the Party. Yet this approach carries risks. Frequent purges can erode institutional memory, breed paranoia, and undermine morale. If loyalty trumps merit, the PLA may struggle to cultivate the kind of strategic thinkers needed for complex, modern warfare. Moreover, the international community is watching closely.
These expulsions raise questions about stability within China’s command structure, especially as Beijing projects power beyond its borders. In the end, Xi’s purge is less about rooting out corruption and more about reasserting dominance. It is a reminder that in China’s political-military nexus, power is not shared—it is centralized, enforced, and recalibrated as needed.
/europeantimes.org