Next month, Chairman Xi Jinping will extend his term in power for another five years, as the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) conducts its all-important 20th Party Congress.
Perhaps only the state funeral of Queen Elizabeth II could compare to the pomp and ceremony that will accompany this congress in Beijing, with the weeklong conclave commencing on 16 October.
It will be a highly orchestrated affair designed to showcase party solidarity, and to of course glorify the preeminence of Xi.
Xi remains firmly in charge of the one-party state, despite swirling rumorus – propagated it seems by the Falun Gong and some Indian media – that a coup had occurred in Beijing.
Military columns approaching Beijing and mass cancellations of flights were cited as “evidence” of Xi being put under house arrest.
This is not the case, however, as rumour mills ramp up ahead of such important CCP events.
A total of 2,296 delegates have been appointed to the 20th Party Congress, including just over 200 full members and approximately 170 alternate members.
They will rubber stamp Xi’s third five-year term in office, something unprecedented since the excesses of Mao Zedong’s reign.
Xi has carved out a niche as paramount leader, with no regulatory end in sight for the end of his tenure.
To borrow a quote from George Orwell’s Animal Farm, “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.” Certainly, none is more equal than Xi. China’s state constitution was amended in 2018 to eliminate any presidential limits, thus paving the way for Xi to remain in power indefinitely. Without doubt, Xi will retain his positions of CCP General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC).
Doctor Willy Wo-Lap Lam, a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation think-tank in the USA, Lam offered this observation: “Strongmen hate surprises – and will go the distance to ensure such events are carefully choreographed beforehand. This is why supreme leader Xi has repeatedly cautioned against ‘black swans’ appearing in Chinese politics.
The putative Mao Zedong of the 21st century has solid confidence in the nation’s artificial intelligence-assisted mass surveillance apparatus; so he has not been daunted by the spate of demonstrations that have broken out in several provinces over bank and real estate defaults and related scandals.
Instead, most of Xi’s energy has been consumed with finalising personnel arrangements ahead of the 20th Party Congress that will consolidate the domination of his faction, and at the same time generate enough leeway to pacify opposition factions as well as party elders, many of whom have been disturbed by Xi’s apparent Maoist restoration and his anti-US and anti-Western stance.”
Creative new ideas will thus not appear at this meeting. The congress’ main purpose is to eulogise Xi and ensconce him as undisputed leader for a third term.
Eschewing the policy of collective leadership introduced to prevent a recurrence of Mao’s errors as “Great Helmsman”, Xi opted to concentrate all decision-making power in his own hands.
His hold over such areas as finance, foreign policy, personnel and ideology will be strengthened after the 20th Party Congress, despite the presence of the Communist Youth League Faction headed by Premier Li Keqiang, and the Shanghai Faction previously led by former president Jiang Zemin. In the coming five years, Xi’s power will be even more absolute.
The Central Committee will decide the make-up of the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee and 25-member Politburo.
Their two most prominent remaining Communist Youth League Faction members are Li and Vice Premier Hu Chunhua.
However, it is likely that one will disappear, and quite possible that neither will remain after October’s congress.
Indeed, if Li retires and Hu is not offered a seat, this raises the specter of the Politburo Standing Committee being entirely dominated by Xi.
Four candidates -all of whom are Xi’s men – to occupy up to three vacant committee seats are Cai Qi, Li Qiang, Chen Min’er and Ding Xuexiang.
Yet, stacking the deck like this does not guarantee unity. There was dissension under Mao, and personal ambition will ensure jostling for position occurs under Xi too.
If Li retires as premier, then perhaps the most likely replacement is the popular Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference chairman Wang Yang, who was Vice Premier from 2013-18.
It is difficult to imagine the Chinese elite revolting against Xi.
Indeed, elites are more likely to flee the country and establish themselves elsewhere than they are to conduct coups.
Similarly, Xi has the populace wrapped up tight with surveillance and internal security forces, so large-scale protest movements like that in 1989 are hard to conceive.
That is not to say that public grievances against Xi will not grow in the next term. Sixty-nine-year-old Xi will stay in power for at least another five years, and presumably for the next ten until the 22nd Party Congress in 2032.