Corruption is very much part of the engrained culture of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as recent high-profile disappearances from the ranks of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and government have made clear. Although Chairman Xi Jinping has not given any explanation, the replacement of the top two generals of the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and the disappearance of Foreign Minister Qin Gang follow a well-worn pattern of corruption charges in China. Qin’s last public appearance was on 25 June, and Xi officially removed him from office by a decree signed on 25 July. Qin, a Xi loyalist and rising star who previously served as ambassador to the USA, is rumoured to have had a romantic affair and love child with Phoenix TV presenter Fu Xiaotian, who has also disappeared. The married Qin had only taken up the foreign ministerial post in December 2022.
The Foreign Ministry website now lists Wang as head diplomat, after he was recalled to the post he had held from 2013-22. With just 207 days in office, “wolf warrior” Qin was China’s shortest-serving foreign minister. Chinese people are just as interested in Qin’s fate as the rest of the world, as searches for “Qin Gang” on the Baidu search engine exploded 5,000 per cent in just one week in mid-July! Perhaps of greater concern than Qin’s fate is massive upheaval within the PLARF, a force responsible for China’s nuclear-missile arsenal. In the most serious purge of the PLA in a decade, its commander General Li Yuchao and political commissar General Liu Guangbin were removed from their posts, after being absent from public view for several months.
Eyebrows were raised when General Li was anomalously absent from a promotion ceremony chaired by Xi in late June. As well as controlling conventional and nuclear-tipped missiles, the PLARF would also play a key role in any invasion of Taiwan. The fact that he was appointed to oversee China’s nuclear arsenal, shows that General Li was once one of Xi’s most trusted generals. Xi promoted him to this highest post from PLARF chief of staff in January 2022. China is currently prosecuting the most profound change in its nuclear strategy in decades, so the leaders’ vanishing act represents the most serious cleanout of the PLA in years. Taking over command of the PLARF is General Wang Houbin, previously deputy commander of the PLA Navy. Simultaneously, the PLARF’s new political commissar is General Xu Xisheng, previously political commissar of the Southern Theater Command Air Force. These naval and air force officers were both promoted at a Beijing ceremony on 31 July.
It is unprecedented that figures outside the PLARF should be brought in to lead the organization. This is ample evidence that Xi is alarmed about the status of the PLARF’s loyalty and integrity, and there are rumors that problems include leaked military information. The Rocket Force is one of the most secretive organizations in China’s military, but Western analysts have a fairly good understanding of the force’s structure, disposition and equipment. Cercius Group, a Canadian consultancy that tracks Chinese politicians, said the status of about ten senior PLARF officers is unclear. Last year, Cercius revealed that lower-level PLARF officials had been detained in late 2022. No official proclamation was issued by Beijing, but this is normal for this kind of graft situation.
For commanders with no PLARF experience to be placed in charge of the missile force is a stunning move by Xi. It shows a total lack of confidence in the PLARF hierarchy. More than that, the force’s status must surely influence Xi’s decision-making in terms of whether or not to conduct a war campaign against Taiwan. The PLARF would play a key role, but if Xi has little trust in the force, this must give him pause for thought. Furthermore, if the Chinese leader does not feel that the PLARF can police itself, will he be tempted to divert money to other services in which he feels more confident? Previously known as the Second Artillery Corps, the PLARF was elevated to a full service of the PLA only in January 2016. This arrest of its top leaders must constitute a severe blow to its morale. Indeed, it is humiliating for the Rocket Force, for no other PLA service has ever suffered the ignominy of having its top leaders turfed out in one fell swoop.
Yet it needs to be remembered who it was that appointed the PLARF’s leadership? It was none other than Xi himself, demonstrating that he is just as fallible as anyone else when it comes to judging character. Xi has consolidated control over the PLA in a manner that no recent Chinese leader was able to, but it is obvious that his authority is far from total. Graft lurks deep within the heart of the PLA, as in every level of Chinese society, and there are valid reasons why Xi harps on about the necessity of the PLA’s absolute loyalty to the CCP. As part of the step-up in China’s nuclear strategy, huge inflows of money have been directed towards the PLARF, and it seems this cash injection proved too tempting for PLARF personnel to ignore. This was also evident in another case.
In January 2021, Hu Wenming, once chairman of the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC) and who thus oversaw China’s aircraft carrier program, was expelled from the CCP for “serious violations of party discipline and causing great damage to the national interest”. His subordinate Sun Bo received the same treatment. The disappearance and downfall of the PLARF’s leaders and the country’s foreign minister demonstrate that Xi’s power is not total, and that there are still endemic failings in this tightly controlled communist system. These failures represent a challenge to Xi’s authority; they blight the paramount leader’s reputation, for all were appointed directly by him. In July, the Central Military Commission (CMC) called for a probe into corruption related to military equipment procurement over the past six years, and the establishment of an “early warning mechanism for integrity risks in the military”. Xi told top brass that they must “focus on solving the prominent problems that persist at party organizations on all levels with regard to enforcing the party’s absolute leadership over the military”. We can expect CCP strictures over the military to tighten even further. How widespread is corruption in the PLA and CCP? In early June, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), an internal watchdog, stated that more than 39 senior military and political cadres had been arrested since the 20th Party Congress in October 2022.
The commission stated it would “resolutely eliminate the cancer of corruption with a zero-tolerance attitude”. Stretching back even further, nearly five million lower-level officials (“flies”) and thousands of higher-level “tigers” have been netted since 2012. From 2012-17, more than 13,000 PLA personnel were punished for corruption. By arresting so many, it does expose the graft-infested nature of the PLA. Nonetheless, this case of the PLARF helps Xi to send a clear signal that the military is being watched, and that no figure is too high to be taken down. The CCDI surprisingly acknowledged the double-edged sword nature of Xi’s anti-graft campaign in 2015: “While it punishes party cadres who have violated discipline and laws, it hurts the organization and has caused damage to the party’s image. The consequences of punishing every cadre who violates discipline and law hurt the party far worse than the individuals.” Of course, corruption now is greatly reduced compared to the colossus it was ten years ago. Military officers would siphon money off military contracts, use military property and resources to conduct profit-making side businesses, and buy and sell promotions. The latter was almost essential to advance in a military career, whether platoon leader or admiral. Millions of dollars were moved offshore for personal use, and personnel and their families might eventually move overseas to enjoy their ill-gotten gains. There have been some spectacular arrests in the PLA in the past.
Two former vice-chairmen of the CMC, Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, were prosecuted for corruption in 2014. Xu, who allegedly took at least CNY1 billion in bribes, died of cancer in 2015 before being charged, though Guo is serving a life sentence. Implicated in Xu’s and Guo’s scandals, Vice-Admiral Ma Faxiang jumped to his death in 2014. Just two months later, Rear Admiral Jiang Zhonghua did exactly the same way. Given that these high-profile cases occurred nearly a decade ago, Xi perhaps believes that current military leaders no longer feel as afraid as they should. This disappearance of the top PLARF leaders will therefore help reinvigorate Xi’s anti-graft drive within the military and instill a fear of being caught. As the old Chinese proverb goes, kill the chicken to scare the monkey. In other high-profile corruption cases, General Fang Fenhui, former Chief of the Joint Staff of the PLA, was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2019.
General Zhang Yang, former head of the CMC’s Political Work Department, committed suicide in November 2017 after being investigated. In around 2016, the PLA installed anti-corruption inspection units within departments and theater commands. This mirrored actions in the civil sector, but no matter how hard Xi tries, it will be an impossible task to completely eliminate corruption from the communist system. It was Deng Xiaoping who said in his 1980s’ economic reforms, that “to get rich is glorious”. In a culture that values wealth above almost anything, few have qualms in implementing Deng’s maxim. China’s dual-track economy has seen private entrepreneurs, state enterprise representatives and local officials scratching each other’s backs. Growth and corruption thus go hand in hand, and with no firewalls in place between the government and CCP, the influence of the state permeates everywhere. Furthermore, Xi has no desire for political liberalization to create more effective accountability and transparency mechanisms. In 2015, it was estimated that “grey income”, otherwise known as bribes, contributed to 12% of China’s GDP. Actually, China is interesting in that its widespread corruption tends to go against the grain of international trends.
Corruption usually retards economic growth, but China’s economy grew rapidly despite rampant corruption. As countries become more developed, corruption tends to diminish, but China again seems to buck this trend. Corruption often contributes to political instability, which may be one reason that Xi is so dead set against it. Xi warned several years ago: “There are careerists and conspirators in our party undermining the party’s governance. We should not bury our heads in the sand and spare these members, but must make a resolute response to eliminate the problem and deter further violations.” Despite preaching communism, the relatives of numerous CCP leaders are millionaires, including Xi’s. The Panama Papers showed that many hold stakes in companies registered in offshore tax havens. Ian Easton, Senior Director at the Project 2049 Institute, commented: “Contrary to what you may have heard, Xi Jinping is not actually attacking corruption in China. There are three super weapons against corruption: free press, independent judiciary and non-political investigation branch (like the FBI).
Under Xi, the PRC is now more corrupt, not less.” Easton added a fourth factor contributing to China’s corrupt system, the presence of at least one strong opposition party. “Party-states are inherently corrupt. Corruption permeates every aspect of PRC society.” Unsurprisingly, corruption within the PLA is a direct national security threat. It impacts on the capability of China’s military, because money is siphoned off into private pockets, promotions go to the rich rather than the talented, allowing incompetence to thrive at higher levels, and a general mood of poor morale and ill-discipline reigns. Furthermore, patronage networks form around individuals rather than the CCP, thus affecting the latter’s control over the PLA. As the disappearance of China’s former foreign minister and top nuclear force commanders demonstrates, all is not well in China. After the Orwellian restrictions of the COVID era, China’s economy has refused to rebound. Its economic prospects are gloomy, and foreign investors are pulling out in droves as Xi tightens sovereign control over every facet of business and society in China. Xi’s third term in power has begun, but cracks are deepening.