The US faces a pivotal decision on whether to deploy nuclear-armed cruise missiles on submarines, a move that could reshape its deterrence strategy amid rising tensions with China and Russia.
This month, USNI News reported that the US is considering the deployment of nuclear-armed submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) from modified Virginia-class nuclear submarines (SSN).
In a US Senate hearing panel this month, Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe, the US Navy’s director of strategic systems programs, addressed the complexities and uncertainties surrounding the modification of Virginia-class attack submarines to accommodate SLCM-Ns. Wolfe highlighted the preliminary nature of cost estimates and the need for flexibility in the program.
Senator Mark Kelly expressed concerns about the potential trade-offs of such modifications, particularly the impact on torpedo capabilities and other strategic weapon programs. The testimony underscored the delicate balance required to execute the SLCM-N program effectively considering the limited pool of experienced government personnel and the degraded state of the nuclear weapons industrial base.
USNI News mentions the implications of delays in the Columbia-class ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBN) for the UK’s SSBN modernization effort and the necessity to maintain the “no fail” mission on the Ohio-class SSBN through 2042. In addition, Senator Deb Fischer emphasized the need for diverse options in the face of nuclear-armed adversaries.
Caught in a nuclear tug-of-war, the US is grappling with its nuclear deterrence strategy as China and Russia up the ante with low-yield tactical weapons.
In June 2023, Asia Times reported that America’s sea-based nuclear weapons currently only include strategic submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). Meanwhile, China and Russia have been focusing on developing low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, which are considered to be below the level of strategic nuclear weapons and are intended to support conventional military operations.
The exclusive emphasis on strategic-level deterrence may have created a deterrence disparity between the US and its close rivals, as the SLCM-N offers a tactical nuclear strike capability to counterbalance China and Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons.
The effort to bring back the SLCM-N might also suggest broader deficiencies in US conventional deterrence, with low-yield nuclear weapons compensating for gaps in conventional capability.
Amid increasing tensions, the US may consider shifting its naval strategy to include the deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons at sea as a deterrent to China’s expanding military capabilities.
In a May 2024 Real Clear Defense article, Joe Varner argues that the US should deploy low-yield nuclear weapons at sea to deter China and other potential aggressors. Varner contends that the US must adopt a warfighting doctrine with forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons on warships.
He notes that shift is imperative given China’s increasing territorial claims and military threats toward its neighbors, including US allies like South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. He also points out China’s significant military advancements, such as expanding its nuclear warheads, missiles, navy and air force.
Varner says the US faces a dilemma whether to fortify its forward-deployed forces against Chinese missile attacks or retreat to less vulnerable positions, potentially exposing its Asian allies. He criticizes the post-Cold War decision to withdraw theater-level nuclear weapons from US warships and advocates for their redeployment to enhance deterrence.
He claims that China’s “no first use” nuclear policy is unreliable and that forward-deploying nuclear weapons at sea would provide the US with options to control escalation and deter aggression without resorting to strategic nuclear forces. He adds that the US must push back with its allies and consider tactical nuclear weapons as a component of their warfighting strategy.
The potentially pivotal role of the SLCM-N in strengthening US nuclear deterrence would represent a significant shift in nuclear strategy since the Cold War.
In an April 2024 Atlantic Council article, Robert Soofer emphasizes the importance of the SLCM-N in maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent. Soofer says the SLCM-N would be the first new US nuclear weapon since the Cold War, signaling a strong message of deterrence and reassurance to allies.
Soofer outlines critical considerations for Congress to ensure the program’s success, such as examining existing missiles for adaptation, avoiding overly stringent military requirements and providing effective submarine deployment. He also highlights the need for focused leadership and management to prevent disruption to other nuclear modernization programs.
Critics argue that the US’s proposed deployment of SLCM-N could be more harmful than beneficial and suggest focusing on diplomatic engagement and strategic stability instead.
The Washington Post, in an August 2023 article, argues that placing SLCM-Ns aboard US submarines would complicate the submarines’ primary mission of enemy vessel detection and consume valuable space needed for anti-submarine warfare. It also says that the presence of nuclear cruise missiles would restrict naval exercises with allies and port calls to nations averse to nuclear platforms.
The Washington Post also highlights the SLCM-N’s financial implications, saying that maintaining the missile and its warheads would cost US$10 billion over a decade. The report says the US already has three tactical nuclear delivery systems: the B61 gravity bomb, the W80-equipped air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) and the Trident W76-2 SLBM, thereby making the SLCM-N redundant.
Moreover, the Washington Post report points out readiness issues in the US submarine fleet, saying that 40% of US fast-attack submarines are currently waiting for maintenance. It argues against the revival of the SLCM-N and instead advocates for modernizing the US nuclear triad while addressing the US Navy’s maintenance issues.
In an October 2023 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Andrew Facini argues that the US fixation on hardware and military capability to counter China’s growing nuclear arsenal could lead to instability and potential nuclear war due to the stability-instability paradox. Facini says the US should instead build mutual understanding and risk reduction measures with China to avoid escalation.
He criticizes the promotion of the SLCM-N and other tactical nuclear weapons, which he argues complicate conflict outcomes and increase the risk of rapid nuclear counter-attacks. He also points out the dangers of escalation dominance efforts, which adversaries like China could perceive as triggers for quick responses.
Facini advocates for a strategy that accepts potential vulnerabilities at certain levels to prevent worse conflicts and emphasizes the importance of arms control and communication for strategic stability. He says that the US should engage with China to reduce tensions and avoid nuclear war, highlighting the need for sustained investment in civil society and government processes to maintain deterrence.