Research Report 8 – The Hefazat-e-Islam and the Islamist challenge in Bangladesh

In recent years, the number of terrorist incidents and related casualties have steadily declined in Bangladesh. Yet the problem of Islamist extremism remains, as can be witnessed in the frequent outbursts of massive political violence, increase in religiously motivated illiberalism, and a general shrinking of free, liberal, and secular thinking. At the centre stage of this phenomenon stands the Hefazat-e-Islam (HeI). The HeI is the most recent and largest entity in Bangladesh’s complex web of ultra-conservative, radicalised Islamist groupings. It is categorised by a large variety of terms, for instance as a Islamist pressure group, an Islamist advocacy movement, an ultraconservative Islamist group, a socio-political extremist group, or a Islamic social movement (Mostofa 2021: 53). There are even demands to designate it as a terrorist group. Each of these terms reflects a certain aspect of the HeI; however, none really describes the whole picture of how the HeI is challenging the secular and democratic foundations of the state – and contributing to the menace of violent Islamism in Bangladesh.

During the last 12 years Bangladesh witnessed not only violent mass protests and vandalism stirred by HeI supporters but also a firm counter-reaction by the government – so as to protect the state, citizenry, and law and order more generally speaking. Because many senior members of the HeI were arrested for their role in public unrests, and as the organisation also suffered from a leadership crisis, some analysts even concluded that the Islamist organisation became much less of a threat.

However, such an assessment is short-sighted since it does not consider the facts on the ground. It also fails to understand the Islamist menace in Bangladesh (and beyond) in general – and the the HeI organisation in particular. More concretely, who is actual guiding the HeI? Here we must consider the links between the HeI and other Islamist groups and political parties, foremost the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). The puzzle also requires inquiring on are the relations between the government and the HeI. Further, what is the role of the HeI in the attacks on Hindus and other religious minorities in Bangladesh? How far is HeI undermining democracy, particularly free, liberal, and secular thinking? Must be the HeI recognised as an anti-state as well as a terrorist entity?

Keywords

Bangladesh, Hefazat-e-Islam, Islamisation, Awami League, Bangladesh National Party, Jamaat-e-Islami, Political Violence, Terrorism, secularism, democracy

Table of Contents

1. Introduction – The genesis of the HeI
2. The government’s approach towards the HeI
3. The HeI in transition

3.1 Strength and mobilisation capabilities

3.2 The movement’s leadership: between crisis and change

3.3 Ideology and the myth of being non-political

4. The HeI’s anti-state activities

4.1 Targeting relations with India

4.2 Targeting relations with Western countries

4.3 Damaging the government’s image

4.4 The HeI and its linkages with terrorism

5. The HeI and the persecution of minorities

5.1 Atrocities against Hindus

5.2 Atrocities against Ahmadiyya and Buddhists

6. The HeI’s embeddedness in Bangladesh’s Islamist network

6.1 The HeI’s ties with Jamaat-e-Islami and the BNP

6.2 The HeI-JeI-BNP nexus

7. Conclusion
8. References

List of Abbreviations

AAI                 Ansar al-Islam

ABT                Ansarullah Bangla Team

AL                   Awami League

ASK                Ain o Salish Kendra

BJP                  Bharatiya Janata Party

BNP                Bangladesh National Party

DIG                 Deputy Inspector General

DUTA             Dhaka University Teachers’ Association

EU                   European Union

HC                   High Court

HeI                  Hefazat-e-Islam

HuJi                Harkatul Jihad

ICT                  International Crimes Tribunal

IOJ                  Islami Oikya Jote

ISIL                 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

JeI                   Jamaat-e-Islami

JP                    Jatiya Party

NCTB              National Curriculum and Textbook Board

PBI                  Police Bureau of Investigation

PM                  Prime Minister

RAB                Rapid Action Battalion

SC                   Supreme Court

TJ                    Tablighi Jamaat

UAC                United Actions Council

1. Introduction – The genesis of the HeI

The Hefazat-e-Islam (HeI)^[1] was founded in 2010 by cleric Shah Ahmed Shafi in Chittagong. Shafi was a Deobandi religious scholar and chairman of the Bangladesh Qawmi Madrasa Education Commission^[2]. The formation of the HeI happened at a time ‘when the country was taking gradual measures to undo the Islamisation of its polity by the military rulers in the late 1970s and 1980s’. The emergence of the HeI was triggered by two government policies. Firstly, there was a suggested Women’s Development Policy (Nari Unnayan Niti) draft^[3] – which aimed to provide equal rights for women as regards inheritance, and which was perceived by religious conservatives as contradicting sharia law. Secondly, there was planned a curricular reformation of the Qawmi madrasa^[4] syllabus. One can thus state that the ‘Hefazat [HeI] was formed to protest equalizing inheritance laws for men and women’ as well as to achieve and maintain a dominant position within the educational sector.

However, the group’s aims go far beyond just undermining efforts to ensure more “gender equality” and “madrasa educational reforms”. The etymology of Hefazat-e-Islam is ‘the protectorate of Islam in Bangladesh’’ (Mostofa 2021: 53). Having this in mind, the HeI wants ‘to safeguard Islam from alleged anti-Islamic policies and to end secularism’. Moreover, the HeI sees itself as the ‘absolute authority on Islamic interpretation in Bangladesh’.

During the following years of its inception, the HeI continued to gain prominence by taking a strict anti-secular stand. This was reflected in the launch of agitations against bloggers, denounced by religious fanatics as conducting anti-Islamic activities. The group’s active and direct struggle against secularists gained momentum after the latter called for a repealing of the 5th amendment to the national constitution. This amendment (enacted in 1979) was enforced by the former military rulers and led to a significant truncation of the constitution’s initial secular principle, hence paving the way for religious-based politics. The in 2008-elected Sheikh Hasina administration started not only to reverse the religiously-inspired constitutional and legal engineering measures pushed by the generals but also to undermine future Islamisation attempts of the “judicial sphere”. Actually, the 5^th amendment was already declared illegal by a High Court (HC) decision on August 29, 2005. However, Islamists challenged the HC verdict by filing petitions. On February 2, 2010, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court (SC) dismissed these petitions and upheld the Judgment and Order of the HC; as such it confirmed the illegality of the 5th amendment. Here, Smruti Pattanaik stresses that, while the government ‘restored secularism’, it ‘allowed the continuation of Islam as the state religion’.

However, by opposing the government policies and judicial actions then perceived as “anti-Islam”, the HeI ‘has received support from almost all Islamist groups in Bangladesh’, including the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and the Jatiya Party (JP) (Mostofa 2021: 57).

In sum, Islamists saw these developments, ‘along with the shrinking space of clergy politics, as a threat to their core interests’ – thus leading them to support the formation and action of the HeI. Apparently, there were apprehensions among Islamists that the Sheikh Hasina administration would not only will completely restore the secular character of the initial 1974 constitution but also ‘place a ban on religious political parties’. The HeI stepped up its public engagement and, in February 2010, it called for a demonstration in Chittagong against the “Women’s Bill” and the ‘bid to cancel the Fifth Amendment.’ By championing conservative religious demands, the HeI was able to gain further prominence during the following years.

The HeI ‘burst into the political scene in 2013’ when it started a counter rally against the Shahbag movement which began in February 2013 to protest the ‘lenient verdict’ of a ‘war criminal.’ According to Fahmida Zaman, ‘the movement characterized itself as a ‘secularist’ movement representing the spirit of Bangladesh’s liberation war’. Besides defending the secular character of the country, the Shahbag protests demanded to ban the radical Islamist political party JeI. The HeI ‘tried to brand the Shahbag movement as an ‘anti-Islamic’ (‘enemies of Islam’) gathering initiated by atheist bloggers.’

In this context, the HeI formulated and proclaimed a list of ‘13 demands’^[5]:

(1) The reinstatement of Islamic phrasing (literally ‘Absolute trust and faith in Allah’) in the Constitution of Bangladesh as one of the fundamental principles of state policy. This includes the abolition of all laws which conflict with the values of the Qur’an and Sunnah.

(2) The enactment of an anti-defamation law by the parliament keeping the death penalty as the highest form of punishment to prevent defamation of Allah, Muhammad (PBUH) and Islam, and to prevent spreading hate (‘smear campaigns’) against Muslims^[6]. In brief, the aim is to implement capital punishment for blasphemy.

(3) An immediate end to negative propaganda (“derogatory comments”) by all “atheist leaders” of the Shahbagh movement, atheist bloggers, and other anti-Islamists; arrests and stern punishments are also demanded.

(4) An end to all alien cultural practices (foreign cultural intrusions) like immodesty, lewdness, misconduct, free mixing of men and women in public spaces, candle-light vigils – and put an end to adultery, injustice, and shamelessness, among other things, committed in the name of freedom of expression and the individual.

(5) The abolition of the anti-Islamic inheritance law (anti-Islam women policy) and the ungodly education policy, as well as making Islamic education compulsory at all levels from primary to higher secondary school. This includes lifting restrictions on mosques and removing obstacles for the holding of religious programmes.

(6) The government declaration of Qadianis (Ahmadiyya) as non-Muslims – and an end to their publicity and ‘conspiracies’.

(7)  To stop turning Dhaka, the city of mosques, into a city of idols (statues), and stop installing sculptures at road intersections, colleges, and universities.

(8) The removal of all obstructions at Baitul Mokarram and all mosques in Bangladesh, which prevents Muslims from offering prayer, as well as a stop to all obstructions hindering people from attending religious sermons and other religious gatherings.

(9) A stop to the spread of Islamophobia among the youth through the depiction of negative characters in religious attire in TV plays and movies as well as the portrayal of negative stereotypes of the beard, cap and Islamic practices in various media. In brief, to stop misrepresenting Islamic culture and creating hate against Muslims.

(10) A stop to anti-Islamic activities at Chittagong Hill Tracts (and elsewhere in the country) propagated by several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – as well as by Christian missionaries under the guise of religious conversion.

(11) An end to the massacre, indiscriminate shooting and attacks on prophet-loving Muslim scholars, madrasa students, and the general public.

(12) An end to all threats against teachers and students of Qawmi madrasas, Islamic scholars, Imams and Muslim clerics throughout the country.

(13) The immediate and unconditional release of all detained Islamic scholars, madrasa students and members of the general public – and the withdrawal of all false cases filed against them. Compensation to families of all injured and deceased, as well as exemplary punishment of all those responsible, is also demanded.

The HeI handed over these 13 demands and gave an ultimatum of three weeks for the government to implement them. In case the authorities were not willing or able to meet the demands, the HeI leadership ‘threatened to lay siege to Dhaka and overthrow the government’. The Sheik Hasina administration did not address the HeI demands before the ultimatum, and there unfolded a ‘siege of Dhaka’. On May 5, 2013, the HeI ‘organized a demonstration in Dhaka of more than 500,000 supporters’, and ignored several requests and warnings from the government to leave the city. As time went on, the initial ‘sit-in demonstrations’ developed into violence, spreading into many parts of the capital. At night, many protesters continued to gather at Shapla Chattar (located in the Motijheel thana of Dhaka) so as to stay there until their demands (and/or) violence increased. Hundreds of shops and vehicles, buildings, and the offices of the Awami League (AL) and Communist Party of Bangladesh were burned down or attacked (Daily Star 2013b); numerous citizens were killed^[7] or injured. In the early morning of May 6, the government reacted with a large-scale deployment of security forces to restore law and order – using extraordinary, coercive measures. Islamist agitations against the Shahbag movement were put on hold. Nevertheless, the HeI ‘presence in the public sphere did not end in 2013; rather, it shook many secular practices and establishments’.

2. The government’s approach towards the HeI

Even though the ‘siege of Dhaka’ failed – meaning that the government ignored the ultimatum set the HeI – the group and its Islamists allies continued to pressure the authorities by threatening them with violent struggles. Although they were not able to block the repealing of the 5^th amendment, they did feel emboldened as they were able to convince the government to keep Islam as state religion. Islamist protests against the reforms for the improvement of the inheritance rights for women were also successful as they ‘resulted in the law being watered down’ by the government. The HeI conducted various measures to enforce the removal of ‘symbols of secular national identity’ from the public sphere and ‘instigate sectarianism in education’. It also pursued agitations against secular thinkers and writers. The group’s widespread appeal among religious conservatives forced the government to concede, at least partially, to several demands.

In 2015 and 2016, the country witnessed an unprecedented surge of violence against secular bloggers and activists. Hard-line Islamists under HeI leadership renewed their demands for action against ‘atheist’ writers and activists who “insult Islam”. The situation became even more critical after a ‘hitlist’ by an Islamist organization mentioning 84 bloggers known for being critical of religious fundamentalists and the country’s Islamisation was virulently discussed in the press and social media.^[8] Those on the list were publicly denounced as “atheists” and became targeted by militant Islamists, and this to this day.^[9] For example, HeI Ameer (supreme leader) Shafi ‘denounced them as ‘apostates’ and declared that killing them was wajib (a duty) for Muslims.’ To calm the situation, the authorities gave in and arrested several secular writers ‘on the grounds of pursuing “anti-Islamic” activities’. This measure is linked with the work of a governmental body named “Committee to find out and prosecute Bloggers and Facebook Users who are involved in criticizing Islam and the Prophet”. The committee, founded in 2013, prepared a list of suspected bloggers and led to the arrest of several among these.

In 2017, Dhaka accepted religiously-inspired revisions to school textbooks. More concretely, following HeI demands, it ordered the removal of 17 stories and poems by secular and non-Muslim writers from Bengali textbooks.^[10] Additionally, many Christian- and Hindu-sounding^[11] names were replaced with Islamic names. Some commentators note that the government removal of content from school textbooks that HeI considered objectionable indicates that Islamists finally have a hand in editing textbooks, ‘a prerogative they sought for years’. In the same year, HeI-led demonstrations against the statue of Lady Justice (Greek Goddess Themis) outside Dhaka’s Supreme Court (Islamists ‘complained it was a form of idol worship’) were also successful. Its removal on 25 May 2017 (Mostofa 2021: 55) was regarded by the HeI followers as a clear ‘victory’.

Another case in point reflecting the HeI’s growing influence within the educational sector happened in 2018, when the HeI managed to persuade the ruling AL to recognise the Qawmi Dawrah degree (from unregulated madrasas) as equivalent to a master’s degree (from universities) in Islamic studies and Arabic, a long-pending demand by clerics. Additionally, over 1000 Qawmi graduates were appointed to government offices (Mostofa 2021: 57). The government also leased 33 acres of railway land for the expansion of the Hathazari Madrasa. These developments were all naturally perceived as major successes for the Qawmi madrasas.

Also in 2018, Smruti Pattanaik adds, the administration of Prime Minister (PM) Sheikh Hasina ‘asked bloggers to refrain from criticising Islam and passed a stringent Digital Security Act to prevent online activities that may not go down well with the Islamists’. There are already several cases filed against specific citizens, including children, who allegedly defamed religion or made critical remarks related to the HeI.

Observers explain the government’s approach towards the HeI in several ways. From a pessimistic point of view, it is argued that after considering the HeI’s growing (street) power, PM Sheikh Hasina simply capitulated before Islamists without trying to challenge their hostile stance vis-à-vis secularism and democracy in Bangladesh. Another line of argumentation – an obviously tactical one – makes the point that the government wanted to split the Islamist camp by using the HeI’s growing power to counter other Islamist groups and parties, foremost the JeI and the BNP. This is usually described as a “dual strategy” (or carrot and stick approach): appeasing the HeI while at the same time cracking down on other elements of the Islamist camp. The apparent aim of this strategy is twofold: ‘stave off a conservative [religious] political challenge’ and making electoral gains. Following this rationale, Roshni Kapur and others stress that PM Sheikh Hasina received the title ‘Mother of the Qawmi’ (referring to Hefazat-e-Islam’s Qawami madrasa), and that this can be seen as an advantageous endorsement for her party prior to the 2018 parliamentary elections. In this context, it is further argued that the government ‘could not afford to completely dismiss the Hefazat-e-Islam and the group’s demands given the sizeable conservative constituency in the country’. A third, rather “conciliatory-mollifying” group of experts interpret the government’s concessions as a way of keeping Islamists engaged in dialogue (instead of cracking down on them) and thus end violent street protests. Here, Stanley Johny states that ‘the government did not give in to Hefazat’s [HeI] key demands that would alter the secular character of the state, but offered small concessions to the group to avoid trouble.’ However, not one of the readings of PM Sheikh Hasina’s approach towards the HeI seems to sufficiently reflect her policy towards the group.

Obviously, the government realised that being engaged with Islamists, even in the form of a dialogue, only led to an increase of their leverage among  religious conservatives – as well as among sections of the citizenry critical of the actual political and economic state of affairs in the country. Also, the country’s political decision makers had to practically realise that giving concessions to religious fanatics does deter their activities of inflicting violence, political illiberalism, and religious intolerance. Furthermore, the notion presented by some analysts that the AL government wanted to use the HeI as a ‘political weapon’ against the JeI and other Islamist groups is firstly difficult to prove; secondly, if true, it must be described rather as wishful thinking by the authorities than as a concrete political reality. Here, that the HeI stirred protests during the visit of Indian PM Narendra Modi and staged anti-France protests^[12] makes clear that even a minimum level of constructive engagement with the HeI and likeminded organisations is not possible. In other words, appeasing the HeI does not help improve the acceptance of Bangladeshi secular statehood among Islamists. The latest changes within the HeI leadership (after the death of its founder Shafi and the subsequent turn against the government), as well as the HeI’s wilful end to any communication or collaboration with the government clearly reveal the deeply entrenched and anti-systemic nature of Islamist organisations. The HeI and liberal democratic values are incompatible.

However, beyond the different views on the relations between the government and the HeI, there is the fact that by March 2021 PM Sheikh Hasina had taken a tough stand on the group, its affiliations, and its supporters. The authorities had conducted the first series of punitive measures in connection with the mayhem carried out by the HeI supporters in May 2013.^[13] However, in the following years it appeared that the government tried to return to their initial approach in trying to ignore HeI protests – while at the same time continuing to act against the JeI.

According to a USIP report, by 2020, the AL’s embrace of HeI ‘began to backfire’. The HeI and its supporters maintained not only their Islamist agenda but also their political agitations. Moreover, the growing power of Islamists was reflected in the formulating and propagating of more hard-line positions, particularly those impacting the political decision-making of the Sheikh Hasina administration. It is interesting to note that the HeI leadership and its supporters hail any decision by the government which might have a – more or less obvious – linkage with Islamist demands as a success for the Islamist cause (understood as the ‘shaping the attitude of the government towards religion and preservation of Islam’) in Bangladesh. And the HeI is quick claim credit.

3. HeI in transition

3.1 Strength and mobilisation capabilities

HeI founder Shafi functioned not only as the supreme leader (Ameer) but also as the Muhtamim (Rector or Principal) of the Hathazari Madrasa (Mostofa 2021: 53). The Hathazari Madrasa (or Al-Jamiatul Ahlia Darul Ulum Moinul Islam), located in Bangladesh’s Chittagong District, was established in 1896 and is recognised today as the country’s largest and oldest Deobandi seminary. Moreover, it is the second largest University of its kind and ranks among the top ten madrasas in the Indian subcontinent. One needs to mention that the HeI’s strength (“street power”) lies in its mobilizational capabilities. These in turn derive from ‘its institutional architecture as a networked organisation of madrasas teaching orthodox Islam’. By hosting the headquarter, the Hathazari Madrasa (with its thousands of students) provides the HeI with a large-scale pool for recruitment^[14]. Additionally, the Hathazari Madrasa and its remarkable religious reputation possesses a tremendous leverage among the large network of Qawmi madrasas in Bangladesh. Consequently, the HeI can rely on the support of several tens of thousands^[15] Qawmi madrasas, enlarging recruiting resources. That many graduates of the Hathazari Madrasa serve as imams at different mosques across the country multiplies the number of people the HeI is able “to gather on the street” – hence exponentially increasing Islamist influence.

Additionally, besides its tremendous leverage within the Madrasa educational sector, another major source of power is the HeI’s involvement in social and welfare activities allowing Islamists to capture public space. As is the case with other Islamist movements worldwide (foremost the JeI), support for the ‘highly conservative social vision’ of the HeI ‘is buttressed by the charity work of its madrasas, which house orphans, hold religious services for the poor, and provide financial relief to poor families.’ According to a 2009 report by The National Bureau of Asian Research:

‘The growing involvement of the ulama in social welfare and community services through ulama-led NGOs has further strengthened their organic links with local communities, and has provided them with opportunities for more frequent interaction with government officials. Their participation in the modern public sphere has opened up new avenues for them to disseminate their views on issues of socio-religious and cultural concerns to a wider audience.’

In consequence, despite increasing measures by security and law enforcement agencies in the last years (such as the arresting and jailing of many members of the HeI leadership and followers) ^[16], the HeI possesses significant political and social power. Moreover, the HeI was able ‘to expand its network of conservative madrasas and promote an illiberal brand of religious practice, social views, and Islamically informed governance among a growing proportion of the population’. Today, the HeI functions as an umbrella organisation pulling together ‘a series of long-established political groups and organisations that have never before displayed such unity.’ Under the HeI’s banner, Islamist forces in Bangladesh ‘became more organized’. The HeI enjoys support particularly from those political parties ‘whose political visibility was reduced after the AL assumed power’.

 3.2 The movement’s leadership: between crisis and change

The HeI is currently headed by its third Ameer Mahibullha Babunagari (see also table below) – supported by the group’s Secretary General Sajidur Rahman. Observers agree that the HeI leadership is in crisis, and this for several reasons:

Firstly, we observed the demise of two successive Ameers Ahmed Shafi and Junaid Babunagari. Secondly, several key figures of the group were arrested. It’s reported that by June 2021, over 50 HeI leaders were in jail – and 77 cases had been filled, accusing hundreds of people. If one considers mid-level figures and other supporters, law enforcement agencies had arrested 300 people belonging to the group by April 2021^[17]. As of May 24, 2022, the number of HeI leaders and supporters arrested reached the level of 1230.

Thirdly, the HeI’s coherence is threatened by factionalism. The first remarkable seeds for dissent can be identified in the context of the “failed Dhaka siege” and the subsequent first wave of arrests of group leaders. Here, it is important to note that the then Secretary General Junaid Babunagari (among other key figures) wanted to pursue the May 2013 protests, despite their violence, and that the security forces did show a ‘zero-tolerance approach’ towards extremists at that time. However, Ameer Shafi ‘did not show any interest’ in further agitations and skipped the rally. Shafi and his son Anas Mandani left the capital – while Babunagari was arrested. In 2018, Shafi’s decision ‘to host a public reception [titled ‘Shokrana Mahfil’] for PM Sheikh Hasina for recognizing the top Qawmi degree’ was not well perceived by several HeI leaders, exactly because of the government’s tough measures against the group 5 years prior. Authorities also pursued crackdowns on Jihadists groups during the following years – including sporadic yet direct actions against HeI members; predictably, the HeI policy of realignment with the Sheikh Hasina administration was increasingly challenged by anti-AL elements within the group. Particular among these oppositions, then General Secretary Junaid Babunagari (known for being close to the BNP) disagreed with Shafi’s claims that core Islamist issues were finally considered in the political decision-making by PM Sheikh Hasina, and that this constituted a success of the HeI’s “conciliatory approach” towards the government. Additionally, Junaid Babunagari and other key figures of the HeI were of the opinion that Shafi moved away from the group’s “13-point demands”. The simmering internal frictions became more visible in June 2020, ‘as Shafi issued a public rebuke amid rumours that Babunagari would succeed him’. A more severe confrontation between Shafi and Babunari appeared inevitable when the former not only dismissed the latter as deputy director of the Hathazari Madrasa, but also expelled him from the institution.

Fourthly, that the selection and appointment processes of the new Ameer (after Shafi’s death) were highly tensed is seen as an indicator that the HeI was severely fractured by rivalries. This perspective is supported by the fact that since Shafi passed away the group underwent changes in fundamental policy directions, foremost regarding the group’s stand vis-à-vis the AL government and vis-à-vis other leading Islamist entities in Bangladesh. The fact that relatives and HeI members close to Shafi^[18] suggested that the death of the Ameer was an ‘unnatural death’, perhaps a ‘planned murder’ by rivals within the group, also hunts at strong factionalism. After Shafi’s death, on December 17^th, 2020, a murder case against 36 leaders and activists of the HeI^[19]was filed with a Chittagong court^[20] by Md Moyeenuddin (a brother-in-law of Shafi who ‘does not held any post’ in the HeI). It was argued that strongman Babunagari and his supporters were ‘plotting to take control of the country’s Qawmi madrasas in order to implement their own [new] “agenda”’.

Regardless of the rumours and accusations in the context of Shafi’s death, the fact is that Junaid Babunagari’s followers ‘started to dominate Hefazat’, especially as he himself regained leverage within the Hathazari Madrasa. Before he was able to conduct his “coup” and become the new Ameer, several preparatory measures had to be undertaken. Shafi was forced to step-down – a day before he died – as ‘director general of the Hathazari Madrasa in Chittagong’ (the ‘de facto headquarter’ of the HeI), a post which provides an HeI Ameer with the most crucial source of power and legitimacy within the HeI. According to observers, the ‘control of the Hathazari Madrasa usually determines who will lead the Qawmi madrasa-based organization Hefazat [HeI]’. Moreover, before Shafi was forced to relinquish power, he had to expel his son Anas Madani from his own teaching position at the institute. Several other religious scholars known for being close to the Ameer’s son were also removed, demoted or replaced. HeI members belonging to the Babunagari faction claimed that Anas Madani ‘was instrumental to the Hefazat’s rapprochement with the government’; that he ‘was making all organizational decisions in compliance with instructions from the government, and that many of those had his father’s support’. More “pro-Babunagari” hard-liners  opposing the AL government were given key positions. Leaders who had a ‘good working relationship’ with PM Hasina and her administration were excluded from the newly formed central committee.^[21] The group also severed all (unofficial) communication channels with the government.

That Shafi’s health was already deteriorating, combined with allegations of corruption and dysfunctionality in the management of the educational centre, helped Babunagari build up a support base against the HeI supreme leader. By mobilising the madrasa students for protests, Babunagari turned the HeI’s tactic against Shafi himself, just as it was so successfully used vis-a-vis the government to extract concessions. In the media, the ‘unprecedented student’ agitations and the ‘subsequent fall of Shafi were attributed to Junaid Babunagari’.

As such, it is crucial to highlight that the determination of the Babunagari faction to side-line Mandani went beyond the apparent goal of weakening the “Shafi faction”. It was sending a clear message to both the HeI leadership and rank-and-file that there would be a new policy direction – meaning that the HeI would distance itself from the AL government.

The first public evidence of a change in policy was the HeI’s stand against memorials to honour former president Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Apparently emboldened by his increasing leverage within the group (which Babunagari interpreted as political leverage vis-à-vis the AL), in December 2020, the HeI (among other Islamist entities) under Babunagari formulated its opposition to the erection of statues of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, ‘because the movement considers statues un-Islamic’. This led to the vandalization of one sculpture in Kushtia by madrasa students (‘Kushtia incident’^[22]). The Kushtia incident is of high symbolic importance. By opposing a stature of Sheikh Mujibur, who is perceived as the ‘father of the nation’ (Bangabandhu), the HeI rejects the statehood of Bangladesh itself, the right of the Bangladeshi people to exist as a sovereign nation, and of course the founding principles enshrined in the country’s constitution. According to a press release by the Dhaka University Teachers’ Association (DUTA), the Kushtia incident is ‘absolutely a act of anti-liberation forces who want to make Bangladesh’s independence and sovereignty dysfunctional and the country a backward state’. Despite the fact that the HeI insisted that it rejects statues on general terms and for theological reasons, Afsan Chowdhury rightly points out that ‘it was never about any religious issue; it was about challenging the state’. He argues that the decision to construct a statue of Mujibur Rahman ‘is not a party decision, not an incumbent government decision, but a state decision. By opposing it, the Islamists have challenged the state.’ Nevertheless, since in today’s Bangladesh the distance between state and government is ‘closer than ever’, the HeI in fact turned against both – as represented by PM Sheikh Hasina and the ruling party AL. Following this rationale, the researcher emphasizes that the HeI ‘can’t claim to be a social body anymore, it has ‘become an “enemy of the state”’ and is ‘not a religious force anymore’. As such, he underlines the HeI leadership’s new approach to put Islamists on a collision course with the state as well as with the AL.

Moreover, Babunagari’s rejection of the statue of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman prepared the ground for further HeI hostility towards the government, most noteworthily the anti-India agitations during the visit by Indian PM Modi. That Babunagari studied in Pakistan’s Jamia Uloom-e-Islamia for four years is seen by observers as the reason that anti-India sentiments are deeply entrenched in his thinking and acting. According to some analysts, Babunagari and other members of the HeI ‘have been in constant touch with the Pakistani mission in Dhaka and have also met with ISI agents’.

In August 2021, Junaid Babunagari died and was succeeded by Mohibbullah Babunagari, the maternal uncle of Junaid and former vice-president of the Islamist political party Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ), as new Ameer. Earlier, Mohibullah Babunagari served as the organisation’s chief adviser. Unlike the appointment of Junaid, Mohibullah’s takeover of the HeI as its new head was relatively smooth. One must expect that Mohibullah will pursue Junaid’s policies. Like Junaid, he was much disappointed by Shafi’s reduced engagement regarding the “13-point demands” and disapproved the suspension of the May 2013 Dhaka protests. Mohibullah even temporarily resigned from the HeI due to Shafi’s policies and the group’s relations with the AL government.

Table: Supreme leaders of the HeI:

Name	Tenure	Major political activities/ policy direction
Shah Ahmed Shafi	2010 – 18 September 2020 (death)	Ø Opposed women’s equal rights in inheritance law (2011);Ø Opposed a curricular reformation of Qawmi madrasa syllabus (2011);Ø Launched a campaign against secular thinkers and writers (Start 2011-onwards);Ø Adopted a dual strategy of co-optation (“collaboration”) and pressure vis-à-vis the AL government;Ø Preference on negotiations as “modi operandi” with the government so as to achieve goals;Ø Did not share the anti-India & pro-Pakistan agenda of other Islamists such as the JeI.
Junaid Babunagar	18 September 2020 (acting Ameer)/ 15 November 2020 (elected Ameer) – 19 August 2021 (death)	Ø Changed the HeI’s stand on India from “neutral” to “hostile”;Ø Fomented anti-France agitation;Ø Fomented anti-India/Modi protests;Ø Cut communication & other forms of interaction with the AL government;Ø Chose a confrontational course with AL government;Ø Fomented open and direct anti-state agitations.
Mahibullha Babunagari	19 August 2021 – today	■ Basically, continuation of Junaid policies; howeverØ Promoted a policy of public ‘low profile’ due to government crackdowns;Ø Consolidated his own ‘leadership’ and placed the release of arrested members as a top priority.

Source: Author’s own compilation based on quoted references.

3.3 Ideology and the myth of being non-political

The HeI is influenced by Wahhabi, Salafi, Islamist and Deobandi ideologies (Mostofa 2021: 53). According to Ishfaq Ilahi Choudhury, the HeI ‘represent a very narrow, obscurantist view of Islam, akin to the Talibans of Pakistan and Afghanistan’. The Sydney-based scholar Mubashar Hasan argues that the HeI’s articulated historical and cultural roots run deep within orthodox segments of the Bangladeshi society. These Islamist elements emerged right after independence and favoured measures that truncated freedom of speech, particularly regarding the expression of liberal and secular thinking. The first well-known victim of Islamist agitations was the writer Daud Haider, who was declared as a “blasphemous poet” in 1974 (Hasan 2020:84-85). The “anti-Daud protests” were led by Qawmi madrasa students, otherwise known for their ‘anti-liberal positions and actions’. Another early, prominent example of how Islamists aim to silence secular intellectuals concerns the author Taslima Nasrin, who was also denounced as “blasphemous” (Hasan 2020: 115-116). Both Daud and Nasrin were forced into exile after Islamists pressured then governments through large-scale street protests (and directly threatened the authors’ lives). The 1994 agitations were conducted by the United Actions Council (UAC), an ‘alliance of several known and unknown Islamist parties’ (Rashiduzzaman 1994: 982) and by the ‘Qawmi madrasa movement’. Some UAC elements, noteworthily the IOJ, have close personal links with the HeI. There are numerous cases in which HeI members serve as candidates for the IOJ during elections. Here, one must assume that the HeI’s founders were also driving elements in the UAC. Because  HeI membership is deeply embedded in the emergence of societal phenomena and entities such as the UAC (and the Qawmi madrasa movement), Hasan sees within the HeI a ‘legacy of illiberalism’ and states that ‘many of the demands made by the UAC then are similar to those outlined by HIB [HeI] in 2013’.

To summarize with the words of Dhaka University’s Vice Chancellor AASM Arefin Siddique, ‘Hifazat-e-Islam campaigning against democratic forces in the name of religion is acceptable in no way’. It becomes clear that HeI and like-minded Islamist groupings in Bangladesh are ‘offering an Islamic Khilafat as a viable alternative to the democratic order’.

Officially insisting that it is not a political party, the HeI ‘declares it has no electoral ambition’ and ‘does not have any explicit political agenda to take power’. And indeed students of the Hathazari Madrasa must sign a sworn statement (halaf nama, written in Urdu) that ‘at the time of their madrasa admission to the effect that, while studying in this madrasa, they will not join or work for any political organization’. However, in practice, the ban on and subsequent sanctioning of “political activities” (like exclusion from the institution) does not refer to any engagement linked to “Islamic issues”. This phenomenon is best described by Hathazari Madrasa-based Mufti Jashim-ud-Din, who makes a clear distinction between duniyavi syasat (secular politics) and Islami syasat (Islamic politics). According to the religious scholar, ‘madrasas cannot remain silent whenever there is an “attack on Islam”’ and ‘to defend Islam and the Qur’an is “an imaani dayitya (religious responsibility); regardless of whoever is in power, we join hands with other madrasas and protest against any un-Islamic moves.”’ For Jashim-ud-Din and other madrasa elders, ‘sending madrasa students on the streets to protest against Taslima Nasreen’s writings, or to incite violence against the Ahmadiy[y]a minority, is considered “halal” politics’. That is, although madrasa scholars condemn student links with political parties or involvement in partisan politics, they have ‘no hesitation in encouraging’ students to “go out on the streets whenever Islam is in danger.”’ In order to protect their vision of Islam and the role religion should play in state and society, the group formulated demands vis-à-vis the government on several occasions – always using students as a form of street-based political pressure. According to a report by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), these ‘demands constitute a clear political vision that has become increasingly powerful in politics’. The most remarkable is the list containing the HeI’s ‘13-point demand’ outlined above.

4. The HeI’s anti-state activities

Numerous observers claim that in the first years after its formation, the HeI maintained some kind of “collaborative ties” with the government. However, considering the frequency and intensity of clashes between security forces and the HeI – as well as the following crackdown on the HeI’s leadership and sympathisers – that assessment must be questioned. Indeed, there is a common sense that due to the extensive use of its street power, the HeI under its first Ameer Ahmed Shafi was able to force the Sheikh Hasina government to give in to some of its demands. all also concur that the AL administration attempted, over time, to follow a policy of ‘co-optation’ based on both religious concessions and several economic (financial) benefits. In return, the government expected the HeI to restrain from violent agitations and provide PM Sheikh Hasina with some leverage among the country’s large conservative constituencies. Apparently, this reconciliatory policy did not work out either for the government nor for Islamists – who were fissured by factional politics, corruption, and criminal practices. Additionally, the HeI took on an increasing disastrous, confrontational course over time. In order to destabilize the government, the HeI carries out various activities aiming at disturbing the country’s foreign relations – foremost with India and the West, namely the US and the European Union (EU; especially France). The goal seems to be damaging the government’s image abroad and provoke sanctions (as well as other punitive measures and negative ramifications). Additionally, the HeI not only conducts mass protests to undermine good governance but is also involved in atrocities against the country’s religious minorities so as to disturb communal harmony. There are police reports stating that the HeI ‘hatched conspiracies to topple the government’ in both 2013 and 2021. By commenting on the HeI-conducted mayhems, current Information Minister Hasan Mahmud stated that ‘the recent violence were not isolated events, as those were part of a bigger plan by the BNP-Jamaat alliance [backing the HeI protests] to grab power by ousting the government’. The Minister further referred to foreign and local newspaper reports, ‘on how the BNP-Jamaat alliance actively participated in the violence and funded the miscreants… Pakistani intelligence also helped them’.

4.1 Targeting relations with India

The HeI has an anti-New Delhi stance – reflected in attempts to stir anti-Indian sentiments among the general public but also in concrete activities to harm India-Bangladesh ties. The most noteworthy example concerns the protests held during Indian PM’s Narendra Modi visit to the country in March 2021. From 26 to 28 March, the HeI sparked violent mass agitations all over the country. For example, Hathazari Madrasa students staged a procession in Chittagong^[23] on March 26. This was officially a protest over the clashes appearing after the jumma prayers on 26 March at Baitul Mukarram in Dhaka; however, it soon became obvious that students were primarily interested in stirring unrest against the state. The fact that several government offices, including police stations, were torched can be seen as a reliable hint. The violence and vandalism continued, even intensified on 27 and 28 March, reaching a devastating level in Brahmanbaria, and other urban areas like Chattogram, Dhaka, and Narayanganj.

From a HeI point of view, these protests served several purposes: first, to cast shadows over PM Modi’s visit (and subsequently to harm bilateral relations); second, to provoke coercive measures by security forces so as to restore law and order. such measures were then used by Islamists as part of their strategy in portraying a repressive government. Observers are concerned that the stirring of anti-India feelings ‘feeds broader illiberal views in Bangladesh’, a potential ramification which is obviously intended by the HeI and other Islamists.

4.2 Targeting relations with Western countries

The then HeI Ameer Junaid Babunagari took a clear stand against “the West”, namely in his ‘four-point demands’ publicly announced for the first time during a rally in November 2020. Besides the already known call for banning Ahmadiyya activities and declaring them as un-Islamic (see the “13-point demand” above), Babunagari, demanded the ‘expulsion of the French Ambassador from Bangladesh’, the ‘closure of French Embassy in Dhaka’, and the passing of a resolution in the Bangladeshi parliament condemning the “anti-Islam” happenings in France. Additionally, he asked for a ‘closure of all activities of the International Society of Krishna Consciousness (ISCKON) all across Bangladesh’.

The occasion leading to the HeI’s staged protests was the French President Emmanuel Macron’s ‘stance on the right to publish cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad’ referring to the Paris-based satire magazine Charlie Hebdo.’ The president considers it essential to stress his willingness to protect France’s freedom of speech laws – most especially since the killing of French teacher Samuel Paty, who had shown caricatures of the Muslim prophet to his class, on October 16, 2020. The fact that Macron ‘held his ground against attacks by Islamist extremist forces’ on his country’s normative, secular foundation^[24] – combined with his view that ‘Islam is a religion that is in crisis all over the world today’ – triggered a wave of condemnation across the Muslim world, and perhaps especially in Bangladesh.

On November 2, 2020, the HeI leader has issued a 24-hour ultimatum to the government to cut all diplomatic ties with Paris. Babunagari also called for a boycott of French products: ‘France insulted our Prophet (pbuh). We ask everyone to boycott French products. Keep French products under your feet.’ The ultimatum followed a failed attempt to lay siege on the French Embassy in Dhaka. The HeI and its allies were able to mobilise over 50,000 followers in the capital. Islamists planned a march from the Masjid Bait ul Mokarram (Bangladesh’s largest mosque) to the Mission of France but were stopped by security forces. However, the HeI’s Ameer had threatened authorities with the launch of another mass agitation were his four-demands not met, particularly if ‘the French embassy was not closed, and the ambassador not expelled’. Babunagari even ‘threatened to destroy the embassy if his demand was not met’. The HeI’s rationale is to increase pressure on the government, and that is why it attempted to capitalise on France’s supposed Islamophobia – created and internally divulgated by Islamist disinformation campaigns.^[25] Obviously, the French President’s defence for France liberal-democratic values in general and the freedom of belief and secular laws made him a target. Here, Macron’s vision to end ‘Islamist radicalism’ and ‘separatism’ and ‘his plan to reform Islam in order to make it more compatible with his country’s republican values’ brings him in diametrical opposition to the HeI’s ideology and agenda.

4.3 Damaging the government’s image

From sporadic reputational attacks to systematic disinformation, the HeI uses a variety of instruments to discredit the government (as well as non-governmental entities and persons critical of both the HeI and like-minded organisations). It is crucial to note that here again the HeI continues a “Islamist-driven anti-Bangladesh legacy” earlier pursued by the JeI. Indeed HeI’s founder Shafi ‘was an important leader of Nizam-e-Islam’^[26] and ‘played an active role as collaborator of the occupying Pakistani forces in 1971’ which conducted a genocide against the Bengali people (and especially against Bengali freedom fighters). Sharing a pro-Pakistan and anti-secular view, immediately after the war of independence, the JeI launched an international campaign to discredit the newly formed state and government. However, the JeI did not achieve much in its attempts to portray Bangladesh as a country which should not be seen as part of the ummah. Instead, most major Muslim countries^[27] soon recognized Bangladesh (Hasan 2020: 75-76). Another major tactic applied by the HeI to discredit the AL government is to portray them as a repressive regime which uses coercive force to suppress the opposition. For example, the HeI spread the rumour that thousands of its followers were killed by security forces during its May 2013 demonstration (“siege of Dhaka”). Even if one were let it slip that HeI members were the main inflictors of violence, the groups leadership ‘could not provide supporting evidence to back such claim’.

4.4 The HeI and its linkages with terrorism

In their detailed analysis of the social fabric of “Bangladeshi militants”, Ali Riaza and Saimum Parvez state that ‘although militant groups have been present in Bangladesh since the 1990s and the country experienced a serious surge in attacks in 2005–6, the situation began to take a turn for the worse in mid-2013’. That is, the HeI’s growing public presence coincided with an increase of violence within the country. Of course, the HeI ‘does not publicly espouse violent means’. However, according to Mubashar Hasan and Geoffrey Macdonald, ‘while Hefazat [HeI] has eschewed militancy, its ideology appears to have inspired violence and harassment’. HeI protests often turn violent. Actually, each major demonstration in Bangladesh since the HeI’s arrival on the country’s political landscape is accompanied by massive violence and vandalism. Already in 2010 (February), the first major Islamist agitation – a collaboration under the HeI’s banner – resulted in clashes with the police and several injured. Violence often follows HeI’s leaders and activists delivers of ‘provocative speeches through religious sermons (waz mahfils^[28]) and social media’. In fact, the HeI has stirred violence to a level which must be termed as terror. For example, ‘after its demands were released, the jihadist group Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT, also known as Ansar al-Islam/AAI) parroted them and went on to murder numerous secular writers, publishers, Sufis, and non-Muslims.’^[29] According to the director of intelligence wing of the elite force Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), Lt Col Ziaul Ahsan, ‘Hefazat activists tried to carry out subversive activities using the May 5 rumour’^[30] and that ‘several such groups, including the Jamaat-e-Islam, were trying to carry out subversive acts in the name of “Hefazat” and “Islam.’

It is interesting to note that several US-based Bangladeshi organisations have urged Secretary of State Antony Blinken to ‘designate Hifazat-e-Islam as a terrorist organisation’. The respective Congress memorandum to the Department of Homeland Security and the foreign affairs committees points out that ‘the Islamic outfit [HeI] claims itself to be a non-political Islamic Advocacy group. But its ideology and activities are reminiscent of those of the Taliban and ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant].’ Several experts note that ‘Qawmi madrasa leaders and students have had links to terrorism’. For instance, after assessing his data, Dhaka University’s Professor Shafi Md Mostofa concludes that ‘people from madrasa backgrounds have always played pioneering roles in militancy in the country’. Moreover, the academic points out that ‘although the percentage of madrasa student-turned militants is low, it was people from madrasa backgrounds who introduced and patronized militancy in Bangladesh’. According to Bangladeshi intelligence sources, there are numerous connections of HeI leaders with (other) anti-government entities. An officer involved in the interrogation of HeI leaders stated that ‘we have found connections’ between the HeI, the BNP, the JeI, the Harkatul Jihad (HuJi, which is today a banned militant outfit), and some foreign militant groups. According to an intelligence report, HeI founder and first Ameer Shafi himself ‘was one of the members of HuJi central committee’. Another link between Shafi and terrorism is that not only his son-in-law was head of the IOJ, but that he himself used IOJ headquarters in Old Dhaka as his own office. It is known that the IOJ extended its support for groups which were later banned for their militant (terrorist) activities.

5. The HeI and the persecution of minorities

According to the human rights group Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK), Bangladesh witnessed over 3600 attacks^[31] on religious minorities between January 2013 and September 2021. Past data shows that attacks on households, places of worships, and businesses owned by Hindus and Buddhists are ‘not a novel phenomenon’. However, it is argued here that there is a correlation between the HeI’s increasing prominence and power and the high number of attacks on the country’s religious minority during the last decade. Considering that the government conducted a major crackdown on many Islamist organisations and political parties promoting violence and terrorism at a time when the HeI became largely spared from investigative and subsequent punitive measures by the authorities, further enhances the need to shed light on the role the HeI and its supporters have in perpetrating atrocities against Hindus, Buddhists, and the Ahmadiyya. Several observers stress that attacks against minorities are part of an anti-state strategy of creating unrest and instability and thus pressure the government. Through undermining social harmony, embedded in the secular (and religious-tolerant nature) of the country, the HeI and like-minded groupings aim to bring out a ‘change in state power’. It cannot be ruled out that a few elements within both the government and the ruling AL, especially at the local level, are somehow involved in repressive measures against minorities. This phenomenon can often be observed when partisan economic interests are involved – such as land grabbing – and to a lesser extend because of religious reasoning. However, the Islamist counter-narrative ‘that the government takes advantage of this chaotic situation to marginalise the opposition’ needs to be rejected since such a behaviour is obviously deconstructive for the government’s development policies and foreign relations, among others.

 5.1 Atrocities against Hindus

In March 2013 ‘hundreds of Hindu shrines and homes were burned down’ after the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) sentenced to death Delwar Hossain Sayeedi, the vice-president of the JeI, for atrocities committed during the 1971 Bangladeshi liberation struggle.

Another major attack on a Hindu community happened in March 2021. Several thousands of radicalised HeI followers gathered at a Hindu village in Sunamganj. The incident took place after a young Hindu man criticised a speech made by Joint-Secretary General Mawlana Mufti Mamunul Haque in a social media post. Many Hindu residents left their home to save their lives. Using that opportunity, a violent mob entered the village, ransacking and looting many houses. According to the police, 70-80 houses were damaged in the assault. In the same month, another wave of violence against the Hindu community happened in the context of PM Modi’s visit to the country, for example the attacks on various Hindu temples in Brahmanbaria.

In October 2021 at the Durga Puja, the largest annual Hindu festival, the country witnessed the ‘largest spasm of anti-Hindu violence in several years’. The communal clashes were related to a blasphemy allegation raised when images of a Quran placed at a Hindu place of worship (a shrine with a Hanuman statue) in Cumilla circulated on Facebook. To further galvanize religious fanatics against Hindus, the HeI propagated a rumour about the Quran being dishonoured and presented it as evidence of an act of blasphemy against Islam. In result, mobs have destroyed Hindu homes, places of worship and statues across Bangladesh, resulting in the death of six people.

There are also other documented cases in which Hindus were evicted from their homes, killed or injured. There are several reports of Hindu women and girls being raped or otherwise sexual assaulted.

5.2 Atrocities against the Ahmadiyya and Buddhists

Since the call in 2013 for declaring the Ahmadiyya as non-Muslim, the HeI became the spearhead of the anti-Ahmadiyya campaign in Bangladesh. Here it becomes obvious that the HeI and other Islamist groups are attempting to replicate the systematic persecution of the Ahmadiyya in Pakistan. As in the case with Hindus and other religious minorities, the inflammatory rhetoric by HeI leaders is regularly accompanied by physical assaults against the Ahmadiyya. For example, former HeI Ameer Shafi called on the authorities to stop an Ahmadiyya religious congregation (annual ‘jalsha’) scheduled to begin in the Panchagarh district on February 22, 2019. Ahead of the gathering, radicalized HeI supporters attacked the homesteads of Ahmadiyya Muslims at Ahmadnagar, Panchagarh. The rampage left 50 people injured and led to much destruction of property. The Ahmadiyya Muslim community’s national convention was cancelled by district authorities. In 2015, a suicide blast by a suspected Islamist extremist at an Ahmadiyya mosque in Rajshahi’s Bagmara, wounded three people. In early 2020, a mosque belonging to Ahmadiyya Muslims was attacked in Brahanbaria town by madrasa students. According to witnesses, nearby Ahmadiyya homes were also targeted. Apparently influenced by HeI demands, fanatic students were calling ‘for a law to be passed to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslims’.

Buddhists in Bangladesh are also facing synchronised persecution by the HeI and other Islamist groups. It is reported that several attacks on the Buddhist community took place during the last years. Kendriya Seema Vihar, or central monastery (with rare Buddha sculptures), and Buddhist homes in Cox’s Bazar’s Ramu were burnt down in a severe attack.

6. The HeI’s embeddedness in Bangladesh’s Islamist networks

Despite formally refusing alliances^[32], it is well-documented that the HeI maintains close links with other religious groups and political parties. HeI key persons and sympathisers had – or still have- linkages with the Bangladesh National Party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, the Islami Oikya Jote, the Khilafat Andolan, the Khilafat Majlis and the Bangladesh Khilafah Majlis’. On November 8, 2013, the Gono Todonto Commission (Public Investigation Commission) of the Ekattorer Ghatak Dalal Nirmul Committee^[33] released a report titled “400 Days of Fundamentalist and Communal Violence of Hefajat-e Islam and Jamaat-e-Islami”. This white paper by the Gono Commission describes the HeI not only as ‘militants’ but also as ‘the B-team of JEI.’ According to police sources, the May 2013 protests were backed by seven political parties – including the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI). AKM Shahidul Hoque, then additional inspector general of police, stated that ‘the Jamaat and Muslim League supported the Islamist group indirectly while Nezame Islam, Khelafat Majlish, Khelafat Andolon, Jamiat e Olama e Islam and Islami Oikya Jote backed it directly’. Moreover, the police officer stressed that ‘Hefajat was in control of the leaders of the seven parties, and if the Hefajat leaders could keep a hold over their group, things would not have turned so bad that day’. The report further states that ‘although the Hifazat claims to be a non-political and a purely Islamic organization, it has been found to be a political outfit with most of its leaders associated with political organizations.’

6.1 HeI ties with Jamaat-e-Islami and BNP

Many observers in Bangladesh see the HeI as an ‘Jamaat [JeI] vehicle’. The JeI suffered increasing pressure because of its siding with the West-Pakistani oppressing forces and their involvement in war crimes during the Bangladesh liberation struggle. Subsequently many JeI top leaders had to face the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT of Bangladesh) – resulting not only in punishments (including the capital sentence) but also in a severe setback for the group as a whole. In 2013, some analysts stated that the JeI survival is not only at stake^[34]; the group is even in the process of disappearing. An assessment which proved completely wrong considering the group’s revival during the last years and its ongoing activities. However, it is also argued that many religious hardliners in Bangladesh, which identified the JeI (as the then largest Islamist group) as their primary platform for promoting their anti-secular, anti-woman, anti-democratic, and anti-state agenda, were looking for an alternative at that time: ‘A new Islamist force was needed and up came the Hifazat.’ A perspective reflected in a statement by former Information Minister Hasanul Haq Inu, which not only accuses the HeI of ‘implementing [the] agenda of the Jamaat-e-Islam’ but also of working ‘like a shadow’ of the JeI. Some secular thinkers and war trial proponents are also of the opinion that the HeI ‘has been financed by Jamaat’ and that the newly formed Islamist group aims to ‘save the Jamaat-e-Islami’ (understood as avoiding a ban) and ‘thwart the trial of war criminals’.

Another line of argumentation considers that relations between HeI and JeI is that of rivalry – and that the HeI rise was only possible because the JeI was weakened. Indeed, the arrest of several top JeI leaders on charges of war crimes had shaken the group’s leadership capabilities and created a vacuum within the Islamist landscape – thus making it easier for the HeI to win over the country’s religious conservative constituencies. Several observers argue that the HeI’s ‘meteoric rise’ is partly due to favourable conditions within the extremist, militant Islamist scene in Bangladesh. The fact that HeI founder Shafi ‘did not toe the Jamaat line during Bangladesh’s liberation war’ and apparently attempted to keep a distance from the JeI itself seems to support the notion of rivalry between the two Islamist organisations. This research report argues that Shafi maintained a distance towards the JeI for tactical reasons, especially for establishing the HeI dominance within the (Madrasa) educational sector in which the JeI is engaged extensively as well, but this does not indicate any severe (hostile) rivalry between the groups. Also, the fact that he tried to keep away JeI members from taking top positions within the HeI is not due to an aversion between Shafi and the JeI, but rather because of the group’s internal power dynamics – in brief, to ensure his own leadership position. That at the end, Shafi’s fall was enforced by “pro-Jamaat” Babuganari (and a central committee with JeI supporters) confirms the before-outlined view on the relations between HeI and JeI. Subsequently, with the death of Shafi, not only were the ties between JeI and HeI eased, but also the BNP and HeI could become closer than before.

Publicly, when the BNP is facing accusations of involvement in violence, it denies any links with the HeI. At the same time, it spends efforts to strengthen the HeI’s non-political outlook.^[35] The BNP also calls for a release of religious leaders (besides its own party cadres) arrested by the government – describing it as ‘insults and harass of religious leaders’. By doing so, the BNP not only supports the HeI and their “13-point demands”, but also uses and promotes the HeI’s rhetoric.

6.2 The HeI-JeI-BNP nexus

Among all the linkages between the HeI and other Islamist groupings in Bangladesh, that most crucial is the nexus between the HeI, the JeI, and the BNP. It is argued here that the HeI in one waay, and the JeI and BNP in another, are but part of the same Islamist nexus challenging everything Bangladesh stands for. According to Matthew Nelson and Mubashar Hasan, the JeI ‘is best understood as an older (but ‘modern’) political-party-based force [which also counts for the BNP], whereas HeI is a newer (but more ‘traditional’) madrasa-based force.’ Despite the lack of formal alliances between the HeI and any political party, including Islamist parties like the JeI and BNP, this report states that cooperation between these entities does exist, specifically in two directions. Firstly, among the party-based Islamist groups JeI and BNP in the form of formal electoral alliances. Here, one need to see how the relations between both parties will develop. At the moment, long-time allies JeI and BNP seem to part away, at least formally; however, they still have numerous core issues in common – and both seek collaboration with the HeI. Moreover, both parties are engaged within the HeI, having members in the group’s central committee and other organs. According to media reports, the HeI’s central committee is comprised mostly of BNP and JeI men; there are so far no reports about fissions between these party-based segments within the HeI. Secondly, there is a collaboration between the party-based-Islamist groups JeI and BNP and the non-party-based Islamist movement HeI. As indicated above, there is some kind of “double-membership” as HeI members are connected either with the BNP or the JeI. Moreover, the HeI as a movement serves the political parties JeI and BNP as a recruiting pool; it also offers ideological support, and in times of election it provides these parties with access to religious, conservative constituencies. Numerous HeI members serve in Islamist parties as candidates at the polls. In return, the JeI and the BNP offer the HeI access to the parliamentary sphere and try to promote the HeI’s agenda. In this context, it is interesting that several analysts note a ‘lack of [Islamist] opposition cooperation’ – which indeed reflects the current state of collaboration between the BNP and the JeI, and partly that with other Islamist parties in Dhaka’s political arena. However, one can state that the HeI, as a non-party based movement, is bridging this gap by providing a platform for collaboration as well as a mechanism to bundle the efforts of the different party- and non-party-based groups pushing the Islamist agenda. As such, one can state that regardless of organisational differences, the JeI, BNP, and HeI clearly complement each other.

7. Conclusion

When it comes to Islamist militancy in Bangladesh, the scholar Ali Riaz (2008) speaks of a ‘complex web of domestic, regional and international events and dynamics that have both engendered and strengthened’ the overall phenomenon. As such, Riaz correctly underlines the significance of considering the international linkages influencing Islamism in Bangladesh. In other words, there is a need to see the HeI as part of the global Islamist challenge. From a methodological point of view, this stresses how important it is to have a wider comparative perspective in analysing the HeI. The report identifies a phenomenon in Bangladesh which the French political sociologist Bernard Rougier (2020) calls an ‘Islamist Ecosystem’. His example involves a network established in French suburbs which links schools, mosques, sports halls, shops, and even prisons. An SADF Policy Brief points out that ‘the components of this ecosystem’ – foremost the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafist groups, and TJ [Tablighi Jamaat], among others – are ‘“competing” to control social spaces (neighbourhoods, associations, etc.); however, ‘they join forces against a common enemy, secularism, which they hate above all else’. ‘All these movements have been “working” within neighbourhoods for a long time – through “religious entrepreneurs”, preachers engaged in a real territorial conquest’ (French Sénat, 2020a: 33). Under the name of “protecting Islam”, the HeI – like the TJ – preaches an ultra-conservative interpretation of Islam. This makes young people [in the case of HeI, madrasa students] more interested in things of faith; it draws them towards ‘a more learned version of Islam’ (Rougier, 2020); however, it also paves the way for illiberal and intolerant thinking and acting. As such, groups like the TJ in France (and other European countries) and the HeI in Bangladesh are pushing processes of Islamisation in their host countries. Moreover, these Islamist groups are contributing to ‘the expansion of ecosystem resources which in turn feeds the jihadist dynamic, providing its fighters with the ideological and material bases legitimising the fight not only against secularists, atheists, and religious minorities in Bangladesh but also against the liberal-orientated ‘global society’ (Rougier, 2020). The HeI’s anti-Modi and anti-France protests can be seen as an indication of this fact. As outlined above, through inflammatory rhetoric and stirring acts of violence and terrorism, HeI members function as recruiters for the ‘first line of the Holy War’. Here, it is insightful to note that the Bangladeshi chapter of the TJ, foremost its more radicalised elements, maintain links the HeI.

To sum up, since its formation, the HeI became an influential force in Bangladesh’s political arena. That the group also became an anti-state force despite major concessions stresses that any ’conciliatory approach‘ towards Islamists will not help improve their acceptance of democratic and secular principles. However, during the last year, the HeI did spend many efforts in re-ensuring the government that it has no political ambitions and that it doesn’t pose a threat to AL rule. Indeed, the group has kept a remarkably low profile in the public space for several months. Some argue that there is currently almost no significant political statement made by the HeI is because the AL was able to influence the appointment of key positions and consequently possesses leverage within the group. Additionally, the group’s leadership was criticised not only from outsiders but also from within the HeI itself. Several high-ranking members^[36] were involved in scandals linked with their private life, undermining the reputation of those individuals as well as of the whole group. To restore the HeI (moral) authority among religious conservatives and avoid defections towards other Islamist organisations, the Ameer was forced to dissolve the central committee as well as to as to give the impression that the HeI is serious about self-improvement. However, considering the deeply entrenched Islamist agenda, and course of action (particularly its violent predisposition) by the group during the last 15 years one should rather interpret the current “silence”^[37] as a strategy to avoid further crackdowns (meaning arrests) and to convince the government to release imprisoned members. That this is the actual top priority was made clear at the HeI’s leadership meeting in Fatikchari on 23 March 2022. The current Ameer seems to prefer the consolidation of the HeI leadership over the goal of antagonizing the government. One should expect that as soon as the group achieves the release of its members and regains its earlier mobilising capacity to create “street pressure”, they will pursue their policy of confronting authorities and attacking free and liberal thinking in Bangladesh. The HeI can’t of course afford to scale back its rhetoric for that long if it wants still to be considered as the “protector of Islam” and the spearhead of Islamisation in the country. Regardless of the apparent weakness in its top leadership, the HeI can still rely on the discipline of its cadres, its tremendous support network (comprised of numerous Islamist organisations), and the political parties promoting the group’s cause. There is no reason to write off the HeI, as the group proved during its relatively young history to be a force to reckon with.

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SADF Research Report- Persecution against the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Pakistan: A multi-dimensional perspective

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https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/politics/bnps-greater-alliance-make-little-headway

Zaman, F. (2016. Journal of Asian and African Studies, pp. 1-11.

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909616666870?journalCode=jasa

Zayeef, A. (2021; April 25). Hefazat mayhem: Around 200 leaders of 21 districts on police list. Prothom Alo.

https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/politics/hefazat-mayhem-around-200-leaders-of-21-districts-on-police-lis t

Zeitlyn, B. (2014). Watching the International Crimes Tribunal from London. In: South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, Volume 9, pp. 1–16.

https://doi.org/10.4000/samaj.3711

[1] In the existing literature, the term Hefazat is also transliterated as Hifazat, Hefajat, Hefajote, and in numerous other ways.

[2] This commission was formed by the Government of Bangladesh on 15 April 2012 to provide official recognition to education certificates by the Qawmi Madrasas. The body also oversees Qawmi madrasas -which are not regulated by the government (meaning by the Bangladesh Madrasah Education Board) – across the country (Mostofa 2021: 53).

[3] This draft draws on a policy document (Jatio Nari Unnayan Niti or ‘Draft National Women’s Development Policy Bill’) which was first presented on 8 March 2008 by the then chief of the interim government. The drafted document promised equal rights to women in property ‘through earnings, inheritance, loan, land and market management’.

[4] Two types of madrasas exist in Bangladesh: the Alia (“noble”) madrasas, which are state regulated, and the Qawmi (“public”) madrasas, which are privately run and outside government oversight.

[5] Sources: The Daily Star; Mostofa (2021: 54-55), Hasan & Macdonald 2022.

[6] According to Mostofa (2021: 54), the current highest penalty for defamation is ten years imprisonment.

[7] There were clashes between police and violent demonstrators already on May 5th. Reports on vary; some sources assume 30 to 50 deaths, even over 60. Benjamin Zeitlyn states that the ‘accounts of the event are strongly contested along political lines’.

[8] Actually, this ‘hitlist’ was already compiled and submitted to the interior ministry of Bangladesh on 31 March 2013 by a radical Islamists organization called Anjuman-e-al-Baiyinat. The group was asking for the writers to be interrogated and subsequently punished for making derogatory statements about Islam and prophet Muhammad. However, the list was sent anonymously to a newspaper in the same year and was published.

[9] By August 2015 ‘five bloggers in the list have so far been attacked, four of whom died on the spot, and another survived narrowly’.

[10] The Islamist cleansing of school text books from ‘non-Muslim influence’ included Darwin’s theory of evolution, as the HeI ‘considers such writings to promote atheism’.

[11] For example, the name of eminent Professor Narayan Chandra Saha, the chairman of National Curriculum and Textbook Board (NCTB), was removed from the textbooks indicating his position at the NCTB – and this because he was a Hindu.

[12] See Section 4 of this Research Report.

[13] According to reports, fourteen leaders of the HeI (along with several top-ranked figures of the JeI and the BNP) have been arrested in that year following the outburst of violence and vandalism in Dhaka and other parts of the country. Additionally, the police investigated 65 cases relating to the happenings in 2013.

[14] This includes also teachers and students belonging to other allied Islamic organizations.

[15] The reports on the number of operating Qawmi madrasas in Bangladesh are extremely variegating, from 25000 (Mostofa 2021: 53) to 40000.

[16] Dozens of its important leaders including many from the HeI central committee were arrested for their involvement in the violence and conspiracy in the context of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the country in March 2021.

[17] The majority of them got arrested in the context of the violent anti-India agitations.

[18] Leading voices in this faction include Nayeb-e-Ameer of Madhupur Pir Maulana Abdul Hamid, Mufti Nurul Amin and Ruhul Amin Khan, Ahmad Shafi’s younger son Anas Madani, Ahmad Shafi’s brother-in-law Md Mohiuddin, former joint secretary general Mainuddin Ruhi, central leader Abul Hasanat Amini, Altaf Hossain, among others.

[19] Some of the  HeI’s  key accused figures were the then incumbent Joint Secretaries General Mamunul Haque, Nasir Uddin Munir, Organizing Secretary Azizul Haque Islamabadi, Assistant Organizing Secretary Meer Idris, Assistant Secretary General Habib Ullah, Assistant Finance Secretary Ahsan Ullah, Publicity Secretary Zakaria Noman Foyezi, Personal Secretary to Junaed Babunagari In’amul Hasan Faruqi, and others. In an investigation report submitted by the Police Bureau of Investigation (PBI), Babunagari and 42 others were made responsible for the death of Shafi. According to the PBI Deputy Inspector General (DIG) Banaj Kumar Majumder: ‘Evidence suggests that Hefazat chief Junaid Babunagari and their Organizing Secretary Maulana Azizul Haque Islamabadi, among the other accused, were involved in the murder of Shafi’.

[20] Namely, the Third Chittagong Judicial Magistrate Court.

[21] According to the HeI’s constitution, in absence (death) of the Ameer, the senior ‘mayebe’ Ameer will be in-charge. The central committee and the executive committee (or a convening committee) will elect the new Ameer.

[22] The Kushtia municipality decided to construct three sculptures of Bangabandhu on the occasion of the centenary of his birth. On December 5^th, influenced by the Islamists ‘provocative statements’, radicalized students vandalized an under-construction sculpture. The incident sparked country-wide protests, organized by a multitude of different political parties and other organisations.

[23]

[24] By stating that ‘secularism is the cement of a united France’, President Macron refers to the official separation of church and the state in his country by law (enacted in 1905).

[25] In an exclusive interview with Al Jazeera, Emmanuel Macron indicated that a disinformation campaign took place against him and the ‘French state’: ‘I think that the reactions came as a result of lies and distortions of my words because people understood that I supported these cartoons’.

[26] A political party created in then East Pakistan (today Bangladesh) which sided with then West-Pakistan, opposed the war of independence war, and provided intelligence to the Pakistani forces.

[27] Including even Saudi Arabia in 1975.

[28] Waz mahfils can be understood as public performances of scriptural commentaries. The Waz mahfils ‘became the most convenient platform for the tirade against the secularist and against the “liberation of women,” and was an attempt to establish a strict moral order in society based on the Quran and Hadith. It constructs a counter-discourse against secular-liberal-modern public discourse in Bangladesh.’

[29] For example, on 15 February 2013 (ten days after the Shahbagh demonstrations began), prominent blogger Ahmed Rajib Haider, whose writings had in part inspired those demonstrations, was brutally murdered outside his home in Dhaka. According to an International Crisis Group report, the ABT claimed responsibility.

[30] The rumour tried to create the picture that many people -meaning Islamists conducting protesting against secularists at Shapla Square/Motijheel- were killed by security forces during the “Operation Secure Shapla” [in May 2013]’

[31] These attacks included the vandalism and arson of 559 houses and at least 1678 temples, shrines, idols, and other places of worship.

[32] For example, in 2013, the Jatiya Party Chairman and former military ruler Hussain Muhammad Ershad made a proposal to the HeI to form an electoral alliance. In return for poll support, if elected, he would make sure that the group’s 1”-point demands would be implemented. However, the Islamist outfit ‘rejected that proposal because one of its influential sections wanted to stick to its “non-political” outlook.’

[33] A investigative 15-member body formed by the civil society movement Nirmul Committee (The Committee for the Elimination of the Killers and Collaborators of Liberation War 1971) on June 1, 2013, ‘to find the actual number of casualties during Hefajat’s May 5-6 rally’. The commission – headed by Former Supreme Court Justice (Retd) Syed Amirurul Islam- comprised judges, lawyers, academics, human rights activists, and journalists. Some of the main tasks of this commission was to find out (i) how the sovereignty of the country came under threat over the May 5 rally of Hefazat-e-Islam (HeI); (ii) the actual identity of HeI; and (iii) the HeI’s demands and aspirations.

[34] Foremost, the JeI and its supporters feared a potential (new) ban on the organization.

[35] For example, BNP Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir emphasized that the HeI ‘completely a religious organization, not a political party.’

[36] For example, Mamunul Huq, Nurul Islam, or Zakaria Noman Faizi became the focus of legal prosecutors after embarrassing leaks about their private lives.

[37] Here it is interesting to note that the HeI remained relatively silent on remarks by officials of the current ruling political party in India, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which were perceived by many Muslims in Bangladesh as ‘blasphemous’. Thousands of protesters went on the streets and attempted to blockade the Indian embassy in Dhaka. However, the HeI showed only minimal participation in the protests. The HeI staged a protest before the Baitul Mukarram mosque that included some central leaders. However, the overall number of participating HeI members remained relatively limited.