Punjab’s dominance and Islamabad government’s misgovernance deepen Pakistan’s inter-provincial water crisis
It is a curious case of Pakistan which expects India to sacrifice its share of river water but has failed miserably in ensuring equitable distribution of water among its provinces. Sindh, Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab provinces have engaged in frequent disputes, as the first three blame the Islamabad government for favouring the latter despite it being the recipient of water from five rivers besides the Indus.
They see it as a persistent failure of federal governance in Islamabad. The water distribution problem has not remained limited to technical disagreements but has evolved into a profound political crisis, exposing deep mistrust between the federation and its provinces. Even though the water distribution problems has a historic background, the Cholistan Canal project of 2025 cemented the perceived sense of injustice.
The anger is directed at the prosperous and politically influential province of Punjab. Other Indus-dependent provinces fear that their interests are being sacrificed as political power takes precedence over governance. The downstream provinces’ concerns over agriculture, drinking water, economic development, and the preservation of Indus Delta intensify as Pakistan’s Indus River System Authority (IRSA) restricts water flows southwards.
Emotions are very high in Sindh as it is the province most dependent on Indus water. Recently, it accused the IRSA of unfair distribution, saying the reduced share risked the livelihoods and economy of the downstream region. The Indus River is a lifeline for the country, but for Sindh it is more than that, a lifeblood and an existential resource.
People in Sindh questioned the IRSA’s management and highlighted its discrimination as Punjab is allowed to draw a large volume of water from the Chashma-Jhelum Canal and Taunsa-Panjnad Canal even as their province remained deprived of its rightful share. Generally, downstream provinces be satisfied during shortage of water in the Indus, but the Islamabad government’s agency was found diverting water to Punjab province through these canal projects.
IRSA came into being after Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and what is now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa signed the Water Apportionment Accord in 1991, so Punjab alone would not alone usurp excessive upstream water. Despite Punjab getting the largest, it continued to eat into the shares of other provinces, thanks to Punjab’s upstream advantage, lack of transparency in water measurement and weak enforcement of the accord.
IRSA failing in its core duty has created a major credibility federal problem, as it is blamed for being ‘Punjab dominated’ even as the Islamabad government is perceived as impartial, untrustworthy and undependable. Sindh government’s pleas were never addressed despite it expressing dissent in IRSA meetings, passing resolutions in the Provincial Assembly, and filing petitions before courts. Now, the IRSA has again brushed aside Sindh’s concerns even as the province fears severe water shortages this summer.
Senior Pakistani journalist G M Qazi said the issue was beyond water mismanagement, calling it a systematic, state-sponsored eco-genocide of Sindh. “IRSA today stands exposed — a blatant instrument of Punjab’s hegemonic machinery, serving nothing but the entrenched interests of the Punjabi establishment,” he said. “This isn’t negligence; this is planned suffocation of a land, a people, a culture. Why is it always Punjab that benefits, while others wither?”
The situation of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is much worse as their grievances raised by them often go unnoticed. Balochistan has flagged inequitable distribution, delays in delivery, and flaws in the allocation formula. It frequently engages in dispute with Sindh as its share is routed through Sindh. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa cannot even ask for its share as there is no proper infrastructure to get water from the Indus.
Now, things are set to become worse and can lead to social unrest if the military-driven Green Pakistan Initiative (GPI) is implemented. It proposes to build a six-canal network, including the flagship Cholistan Canal, which will be built in upstream Punjab. The GPI also includes corporate farming and military-initiated agriculture activities. So, people from Sindh are asking where will the water for these canals come from, when the Indus system is already water-stressed.
GPI will extract more water from the Indus, leaving less for Sindh province. A large reservoir upstream would not only give Punjab-leaning authorities greater control over water but it could also end up damaging the Indus Delta as low water flow may not prevent seawater intrusion, making agricultural land saline. This makes Pakistan’s demand for greater water security from India stand in sharp contrast to its own troubled record of inter-provincial water management.