It began in the mid-1980s with a plan to open a trade route through Myanmar for China’s landlocked inland provinces of Yunnan, Sichuan and Guizhou, allowing them to trade with the outside world without having to rely on a long and underdeveloped network of roads and railroads to China’s own ports. Eventually named the China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), the projects may never been about trade alone: it was also always an integral part of Beijing’s drive to expand its political and military influence on the Bay of Bengal. And now, as the wars in the Middle East have increased instability in that maritime region, long-term strategic goals for Myanmar rank even higher than before on the agenda of China’s security planners.
According to official statistics, roughly 80 percent of China’s imported crude oil transits the Indian Ocean, with Iran being a main supplier. And while China has increased its pipeline imports of natural gas from Russia and Central Asia, between 30 and 60 percent still rely on seaborne routes through the Indian Ocean. China also imports vast quantities of minerals from Africa that must be shipped across the Indian Ocean. And then there are exports of all kinds of cosumer gooods destined for markets in the Middle East, Europe and Africa. All in all, an estimated 65 percent of China’s total maritime trade passes through the Indian Ocean.
Israel’s and the United States’ bombings of Iran, Iranian missiles and drones hitting countries all over the Middle East, and the effective closing of the Strait of Hormuz have severely affected China’s imports of oil and gas from that part of the world. At the same time, the Islamic Republic of Iran has for decades been China’s main ally in the Middle East. It may not be true—as reported by some international media—that the Chinese spyship Liaowang-1 is in the region providing Iran with intelligence about U.S. acticities in the region; satelllite imagery shows the highly sophsticated vessel still in port in Shanghai. But other Chinese ships may well be involved in supplying Iran with useful information.
At any rate, the wars in the Middle East and other recent developments in the region must have renewed China’s commitment to its long-term strategic interests in the Indian Ocean. It has already invested heavily in infrastructure development the Maldives, the showpiece there being a “friendship bridge” that connects the capital Male with Hulhule Island, where the international airport is located, and Hulhumale, a new, artificial island with residential areas as well as industrial and commercial development zones. Chinese visitors also top tourism arrivals in the Maldives, and China’s investment in the its tourism industry is extensive. Pro-Beijing and pro-New Delhi governments regularly succeed one other in the islands, reflecting the importance that both China and its regional rival India place on their strategic location in the middle of the Indian Ocean.
China is also closely monotoring developments in the Chagos Archipelago southwest of the Maldives. In October 2024, a decades-long sovereignty dispute over the tiny islands seemed to have been solved. The U.K. had agreed to return the British Indian Ocean Territory, as it is officially called, to Mauritius, to which it belonged before 1965 when that island was still a British colony. Details about the transfer have yet to be determined—but it is about much more than to whom the mere 56 sq. km of land and 545,000 sq. km of ocean around them should belong. The archipelago has at present no native, or permanent, population, but its largest island, Diego Garcia, is where the U.S. has one of its most important air and naval bases in the Indo-Pacific region. According to the tentative agreement between the UK and Mauritius, the U.S. military will be able to remain there for what is termed “an initial period” of 99 years.
Predictably, U.S. President Donald Trump has been vocal about the agreement. Earlier this year, he called it an act of “total weakness” and “great stupidity.” He argued that the move would be a “blight” on the UK and that the territory should remain under British control to maintain Western strength—and to prevent China from gaining influence over the archipelago once it is returned to Mauritius. In recent years, China has established close economic relations, including a free-trade agreement, with Mauritius and is now a major investor in the small but wealthy island republic. Seen in that perspective, any change in the status of the Chagos Archipelago could have far-reaching consequences for the security situation and balance of power in the Indian Ocean. If the Chinese could gain a foothold through seemingly innocent investment projects like those in the Maldives—tourism and infrastructure—it would provide them with a key vantage point to monitor U.S. military activities on Diego Garcia. And that is what Washington fears.
There are also chokepoints other than the Strait of Hormuz, and it is here that the CMEC comes into the picture. One only needs to look at the map to realize how important the outlet to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar is to the Chinese. For now, trade has to pass through the narrow and congested Strait of Malacca and the contested South China Sea—and then, often overlooked, the 150-km gap between India’s Nicobar Islands and Indonesia’s Sumatra. As early as 2001, India set up the Andaman and Nicobar Command, its first tri-service command, to safeguard New Delhi’s strategic interests in the waters east of the subcontinent—and to keep a watchful eye on China’s activities in the same maritime region. Headquartered in Port Blair on South Andaman Island, it co-ordinates the activities in the eastern Indian Ocean of the Navy, the Army and the Air Force as well as the Coast Guard.
In February, India announced that it is going to build a new airport on Great Nicobar Island, the suthernmost in the group. It is designed to serve military defense purposes as well as tourism, with the Indian Navy controlling overall operations while the Airports Authority of India will manage the passenger terminals and civil operations. In short, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands with all their facilities will form a natural barrier between the open waters of the Bay of Bengal and the Strait of Malacca.
In peacetime, that would not be a serious concern for China, but an entirely different reality would emerge if a wider conflict emerges in the Indian Ocean. And the only way to bypass all those chokepoints—the Nicobar gap, the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea—is Myanmar. There is no way the CMEC alone can replace present shipping lanes, but at least it provides China with an alternative to existing trade routes and give it a platform from which it can expand its influence over the India-Pacific region. It would be naïve to believe that China, with its geostrategic interests, will not play an important role in shaping the future of Myanmar.
That China has provided the regime in Naypyitaw with the support that many Western nations have withheld, then, is hardly surprising. China praised the recent sham elections in Myanmar and is increasingly playing the role of a pragmatic mediator in the country’s ongoing internal conflicts. When a new government takes over in Naypyitaw in April, China will most certainly be the first to roll out the red carpet—and that, in turn, clould also prompt the U.S. to modify its hardline approach to the Myanmar military. Already there is debate in Washington whether isolation and sanctions are driving Myanmar further into the arms of Beijing. Some U.S. analysts, among them the former congressman and economist Dave Brat and Adam Castillo, a prominent business consultant, have begun advocating for “calibrated engagement” with ther junta to secure rare earth elements and counter Beijing’s influence. Alhough this has not yet translated into a formal softening of official policies, it is a scenario that should not be ruled out.
The wars in the Middle East, placing China and the U.S. on opposite sides, have set off a chain of events throughout the region. And Myanmar is right at the crossroads of superpower rivalries, caught up in games way beyond anything the military regime is able to handle.
irrawaddy