Bangladesh is no stranger to political turbulence. But what the country is witnessing today—the serial killing of Hindu citizens across multiple districts—marks a darker turn. It is not merely a law-and-order failure. It is an assault on the moral foundation of the republic, an erosion of the pluralist compact forged in blood in 1971 and reaffirmed, at great cost, again in 2024.
Six Hindu men murdered in roughly eighteen days is not a coincidence. Nor is it random criminality dressed up as communal friction. The pattern is too clear, the methods too theatrical, the timing too politically convenient. From lynching on fabricated blasphemy charges to targeted shootings and arson, these acts bear the unmistakable signature of orchestrated terror. And behind that terror, one sees familiar shadows: Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), their local cohorts in Bangladesh, and a nexus of political Islamist parties and militant networks that have never reconciled themselves to Bangladesh’s secular origins.
Let us begin with a basic truth that extremists—both foreign and domestic—would prefer erased. Bangladesh was not born as a Muslim theocracy. It was born as a linguistic, cultural, and political revolt against Pakistani authoritarianism and religious majoritarianism. In the Liberation War, Hindus and Muslims died together, fought together, and dreamed together. Hindu villages were razed not because Hindus were outsiders, but because they symbolized a plural Bengal that Pakistan’s rulers could not tolerate. To attack Hindus today is, therefore, to finish an unfinished war from 1971—one that Pakistan lost on the battlefield but never abandoned in its imagination.
The recent killings underline this continuity. They are geographically dispersed but ideologically linked. A Hindu man lynched by a mob over false blasphemy allegations. Another was beaten to death after alleged extortion disputes. Others shot at workplaces, hacked in shops, or stabbed and burned after closing their businesses. These are not crimes of passion. They are acts of intimidation. They send a message to a community: you are unsafe, you are watched, you can be erased.
What makes this wave especially alarming is its political context. Bangladesh is passing through an unstable transition following the ouster of Sheikh Hasina’s government. Transitional periods are always vulnerable; extremists thrive in power vacuums. Islamist extremists and their political enablers know this well. So does the ISI, which has decades of experience weaponizing religious identity to destabilize neighbors—from Kashmir to Kabul, and now, once again, Dhaka.
Pakistan’s hostility toward Bangladesh never truly ended in 1971. It merely changed form. Unable to reclaim influence through diplomacy or development, elements within Pakistan’s security establishment have long invested in proxy networks: radical madrasas, militant outfits, disinformation channels, and sympathetic Islamist parties. Their objective is simple—undermine Bangladesh’s internal cohesion, poison Hindu-Muslim relations, and weaken Dhaka’s strategic autonomy by keeping it perpetually insecure.
But external actors alone cannot be blamed. There are willing accomplices at home. Certain political Islamist parties in Bangladesh have spent years normalizing extremist rhetoric, flirting with militants, and treating communal polarization as a legitimate political strategy. They may not always pull the trigger, but they cultivate the soil in which killers grow. Silence after murders. Moral ambiguity after lynchings. Dog-whistle politics disguised as piety. These are not accidental lapses; they are calculated choices.
Yet perhaps the most damning failure is that of the state itself. A government that watches while citizens are hunted because of their faith is not neutral—it is complicit. To remain a spectator in the face of targeted communal violence is to betray the martyrs of both 1971 and 2024. The blood spilled to create and preserve this republic was not shed so that mobs could burn bodies from trees or gunmen could execute shopkeepers with impunity.
Law enforcement responses so far have been halting and opaque. Investigations drag on without clarity. Motives are left “unconfirmed.” Arrests, when they occur, are rarely accompanied by accountability up the chain. This hesitation sends a dangerous signal: that violence against minorities can be negotiated, contextualized, or quietly forgotten. History shows where such indulgence leads. In the 1940s, communal killings escalated because authorities hesitated. In Pakistan itself, minority persecution became normalized because early warnings were ignored. Bangladesh must not repeat those mistakes.
What is striking—and often overlooked—is that Bangladesh’s Muslim majority is not endorsing this violence. On the contrary, many Islamic scholars and Muslim community have condemned these killings openly, recognizing them for what they are: an attack on the nation, not just a minority. Extremism does not stop once it tastes blood.
This is why framing these murders as “minority issues” is dangerously misleading. Communal harmony is not a minority luxury; it is a national security imperative. A country divided along religious lines becomes easier to manipulate from abroad, easier to radicalize from within, and harder to govern democratically.
The international community, too, bears responsibility. Regional leaders, global human rights bodies, and influential capitals cannot afford selective silence. Expressions of “concern” are insufficient. Pressure must be applied—publicly and consistently—to ensure accountability. That includes scrutinizing transnational extremist financing, monitoring cross-border intelligence operations, and demanding measurable action from Bangladesh’s interim authorities.
At home, Bangladesh needs more than condemnation. It needs to be resolved. Swift prosecutions, transparent investigations and clear denunciations from political leaders without equivocation must be ensured. Islamist parties must be forced to choose—constitutional politics or permanent suspicion. There can be no democratic legitimacy for those who provide ideological cover to murder.
The republic of Bangladesh stands at a critical political juncture. One path leads toward the slow normalization of fear, where minorities live cautiously, extremists grow bolder, and the state shrugs. The other path reaffirms the spirit of 1971: that Bangladesh belongs to all its citizens, and that no foreign agency, no militant preacher, and no opportunistic politician has the right to decide who may live here in safety.
History will judge which path is taken. And it will not be kind to those who remained silent while the blood of innocents stained the ground.
