Pakistan’s decision to participate in the International Stabilization Force (ISF) for Gaza has thrust the nation into a diplomatic crisis and invited suspicion from radical Islamist outfits, including Hamas. While Islamabad frames its involvement as a commitment to Palestinian welfare, the move has triggered fierce domestic opposition and raised serious questions about Pakistan’s credibility as a supporter of a historical Islamic cause.
The ISF emerged as a central component of US President Donald Trump’s 20-point peace plan for Gaza, which helped broker a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in October 2025. On November 17, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2803, authorizing this force to assist transitional governance, provide security, and oversee demilitarization. Pakistan voted in favor alongside 13 members, with Russia and China abstaining. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged Pakistan’s willingness to participate, with sources suggesting Islamabad may deploy around 3,500 troops.
However, the ISF’s mandate remains critically ambiguous. Despite the resolution’s passage, key operational details are unresolved, including legal authority, chain of command, funding, duration, and the force’s role in disarming Hamas. Pakistan’s UN representative, Asim Iftikhar Ahmed, noted dissatisfaction with the resolution, warning that important suggestions were excluded, including a clear path to Palestinian statehood and clarification of the mandate.
This uncertainty has created space for conflicting interpretations. While the US plan explicitly includes disarmament of Palestinian groups, Pakistan has categorically stated it will not participate in missions focused on disarming Hamas. Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar emphasized Pakistan would only accept peacekeeping roles, not peace enforcement. Pakistani security officials declared disarming Hamas a ‘red line’.
Hamas has responded with skepticism, rejecting the resolution outright. The organization views any international force tasked with disarmament as a party to the conflict rather than a ‘neutral’ stabilizer. Hamas remains skeptical about Pakistan’s role despite Islamabad’s assurances. Reports suggest Hamas initially rejected disarmament concepts and expressed wariness about foreign deployment undermining sovereignty. Some indications suggest Hamas may be gradually accepting Pakistan’s explanation that the Board of Peace (BOP) operates parallel to the UNSC frameworks. Nevertheless, Hamas remains watchful.
After joining the BoP and ISF, Pakistan’s credibility faces a series of challenges in the region. Critics point to Pakistan’s history of bending to external pressure during economic crises. It is noteworthy that Pakistan’s economy remains dependent on international financial support, including IMF loans and Gulf assistance. This creates leverage that could push Pakistan toward accepting broader mandates of the ISF, including the disarmament of Hamas. The outfit understands that the ongoing economic desperation in Pakistan could override its principled position on the Palestine issue.
On the other hand, Israeli officials have rejected Pakistani participation in Gaza, citing concerns about intelligence sharing and lack of diplomatic relations. Reports warn that Pakistan’s historical ties to Palestinian militant groups raise questions about its suitability as a neutral peacekeeper.
Within Pakistan, the decision has generated intense criticism. Islamic parties and opposition groups characterize it as capitulation to Western interests. Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman condemned the decision, questioning how Pakistan could join a forum including Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. He argued this amounts to self-deception given Gaza’s suffering. Jamaat-e-Islami chief Hafiz Naeemur Rehman called Trump’s Board of Peace a new form of colonialism, criticizing the inclusion of Tony Blair. The party warned that protests would be launched worldwide if the board’s activities harm Gazans. Whereas former Prime Minister Imran Khan argued Pakistan joined a plan to disarm Gaza’s resistance.
It is noteworthy that the support for Palestine runs deep across Pakistani society. More importantly, Pakistan refused to condemn the October 7, 2023, terrorist attack on Israel and openly supported Hamas until the Trump administration came to power in Washington. Furthermore, anti-Israel sentiment is universal in Pakistan, making any cooperation appear toxic.
Pakistan’s Islamic parties retain substantial street power on Muslim causes. During the Gaza conflict, these groups organized pro-Palestinian rallies while providing humanitarian assistance. Any troop deployment resulting in confrontation with Palestinians could trigger a political crisis. Pakistan’s military insists the force deployment decisions rest with the government and parliament. However, it is noteworthy that Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir is the man behind the decision to join ISF and BoP.
If Pakistan participates fully in ISF and the military mission evolves into active disarmament, domestic consequences could be severe, including protests, government instability, and damaged Muslim world standing. Iran, Turkey, and Qatar reportedly view Pakistani involvement with suspicion. On the other hand, if Islamabad refuses or withdraws from its earlier decision, it risks diplomatic isolation from the United States and Gulf allies. Given economic fragility, such isolation could have serious consequences.
Pakistan recently signed a defense cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia and is negotiating expanded cooperation with Jordan and Egypt. The likely scenario involves continued ambiguity. Pakistan will probably maintain its position supporting humanitarian stabilization while refusing to disarm Hamas and other militant groups in Gaza, hoping realities never force confrontation with this red line. However, this middle path may prove unsustainable if ISF operational requirements demand active security roles, including disarmament enforcement. The Trump framework explicitly includes comprehensive demilitarization as a core objective, with the ISF intended to support dismantling Hamas’s military infrastructure. This contradicts Pakistan’s stated red line, suggesting an inevitable collision between the US expectations and Pakistani limitations.
For Hamas and Palestinian factions, Pakistan’s ISF participation tests whether Muslim-majority countries genuinely support Palestinian resistance or ultimately accommodate Western and Israeli security demands. The concern extends beyond Pakistan, specifically to whether the entire ISF framework represents authentic peacebuilding or merely mechanisms for imposing Israeli-favorable terms under international cover.
The coming months will reveal whether Pakistan’s stated red lines on Hamas disarmament are genuine boundaries or merely opening negotiating positions. Hamas’ growing skepticism and the mobilization of domestic opposition ensure Pakistan’s government will face intense scrutiny of every Gaza-related decision. The outcome will serve as a critical test of Pakistan’s foreign policy credibility and its ability to navigate competing pressures in an increasingly polarized regional and global environment. For now, Pakistan faces criticism regardless of whether it proceeds with ISF participation or withdraws from the commitment, illustrating the complex geopolitical realities in which economic dependence, domestic politics, and principled positions often prove impossible to reconcile satisfactorily.