A coalition of Syrian rebel groups, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has seized Damascus, forcing President Bashar al-Assad into exile and creating an uncertain future for Syria. Despite China’s distance from the conflict, the rebel takeover should alarm Beijing. China’s concern stems from credible reports of the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) fighting alongside HTS. The TIP, also known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), is a Uyghur separatist group from Xinjiang with deep ties to al-Qaeda and its affiliates.
The Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) seeks to establish an independent Islamic state in Xinjiang, called East Turkestan. Designated as a terrorist organization by China, the UN, and until 2020, the US, TIP was founded in Pakistan and later gained a foothold in Afghanistan. Chinese pressure has recently reduced its influence in both countries.
In an unexpected development, numerous militants and their families sought refuge in Idlib, a stronghold of Syrian rebels. By 2017, Imad Moustapha, the then-Syrian ambassador to China, reported that Syria housed up to 5,000 Uyghur militants. Turkey supported the TIP’s move to Syria, achieving two objectives: aiding its oppressed Turkic kin and providing shelter for the Uyghurs in northern Syria, where Turkey holds influence.
Moreover, Turkey aims to establish a pro-Turkey barrier against the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in eastern Syria. Turkey fears that if the SDF gains control of the Syrian side of the Turkey-Syria border, Kurdish separatists on both sides could collaborate, threatening its territorial integrity and national security.
When TIP arrived in Syria, they allied with other Syrian rebel groups against the Assad regime and its SDF ally. HTS Emir Abu Mohammed al-Golani stated that TIP has been in Syria for seven years without posing an external threat. They defend Idlib from Assad’s aggression due to Uyghur persecution in China, which HTS condemns. Despite this, their struggle against China is separate from HTS’s goals. TIP is welcome to stay as long as they follow HTS’s rules, which they do.
While HTS supports the Uyghur cause, it has no clear interest in opposing China, making its victory in Syria’s civil war not an immediate threat to China. However, the combat experience gained by TIP militants is concerning. Chinese Major General Jin Yinan stated TIP fights in Syria to highlight the Uyghur cause and gain combat experience for future use against Beijing. This was confirmed when TIP Emir Abdul Haq al-Turkistani urged Uyghurs worldwide to join the fight against the Assad regime and China.
Beijing asserts that the TIP executed terrorist attacks in China in 2008, 2011, 2013, 2014, and 2015, involving vehicle rammings, public stabbings, car bombs, and suicide bombings. Verifying TIP’s involvement in all these incidents is challenging, as some attacks were likely perpetrated by lone wolves upset with Xinjiang’s socio-economic inequality.
Despite the uncertainty, Beijing blames the group for all attacks and has enforced stringent measures in the Uyghur home province, including large detention facilities. These actions may not suppress the unrest forever, as underlying tensions continue to surface. In 2022, China’s Permanent Representative to the UN reported a resurgence of TIP-related violence, highlighting that “the TIP is not only launching attacks in Syria but also using it as a base to recruit and train militants for attacks on China and Central Asia.”
To address the renewed threat, Beijing pledged to collaborate with Syria and others to combat TIP terrorism. This followed reports of TIP’s involvement in a deadly attack at a Homs military academy, killing 112 people. The practical implications remain unclear.
Rumours of Chinese troop deployments to Syria in 2017 and 2018 proved false. Chinese-made weapons did reach Syrian government forces, but through redistribution by third parties or old sales, not new direct arms deals after the civil war began. Despite the alleged rising threat from TIP to China’s national security, Beijing has maintained its long-standing policy of non-intervention, relying on other nations with boots on the ground in Syria to address the conflict.
The only significant step Beijing took was initiating high-level talks with Damascus in 2016 to share monthly intelligence on TIP’s movements. This will cease with Assad’s fall. China’s inaction implies it is concerned about battle-hardened TIP militants returning to China and sparking a stronger insurgency but doubts this will happen. It is unclear whether TIP can or will return to China, sending a message that Beijing, while wary, is not overly concerned.
On one hand, TIP openly promotes their goal in their propaganda. In Syria, they’ve struggled to integrate into local communities mainly due to language barriers. TIP militants prevent Arabs from entering Uyghur villages because they aren’t “Chinese,” indicating a connection to their Chinese homeland. On the other hand, by selling their property in China before relocating with their families to Syria, TIP militants signalled their intention to stay. Additionally, China’s enhanced security in recent years makes it hard for militants to re-enter China undetected.
With the Syrian civil war seemingly ending, TIP may reassess its strategy. For the first time in a decade, they are no longer restricted to northern Syria. This change could lead TIP to redirect militant activities elsewhere. Beijing fears TIP might relocate to Afghanistan and Pakistan, both of which have recently become safe havens for terrorist groups like ISIS-K, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). China remains out of reach for now.
In recent years, attacks on Chinese citizens and assets abroad, particularly in Pakistan, have increased. Beijing suspects these attacks are linked to TIP’s collaboration with ISIS, al-Qaeda, and BLA to undermine China’s overseas interests. If battle-hardened TIP militants return to Pakistan and ally with TTP, BLA, and others, as Beijing claims, it would pose a significant threat to China’s strategic interests, especially the Belt and Road Initiative, which runs through Pakistan. With Assad ousted and the diminished influence of Russia and Iran in containing Syrian rebel groups and their allies, the chances of this scenario have significantly increased. As the saying goes, “A butterfly flapping its wings in China can cause a hurricane in the Caribbean.” Similarly, a thawing conflict in Syria can obstruct China’s global ambitions. It is now crucial for China to reassess its foreign policy toward Syria and beyond.