China’s secret spy bases in Cuba signal a new front in Beijing’s global intelligence game by targeting America’s southeastern seaboard.
This month, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a report saying that China is likely operating multiple spy facilities in Cuba, judging by satellite imagery and open-source information.
CSIS notes these facilities are strategically positioned to monitor sensitive communications and activities in the US southeastern seaboard, home to numerous military bases and space launch centers.
The report highlights four active sites in Cuba capable of conducting electronic surveillance operations: Bejucal, El Salao, Wajay and Calabazar. The largest is near Bejucal, which is known for its Cold War history.
The report notes that the El Salao site near Santiago de Cuba is under construction and will apparently house a large circularly disposed antenna array (CDAA) for enhanced air and maritime domain awareness.
The CSIS report notes that the presence of these facilities underscores China’s ambition to expand its global intelligence-gathering capabilities and provide Beijing with a significant intelligence window into the region.
It also sheds light on the political and strategic motivations behind China’s presence in Cuba, including its support for one of the world’s few remaining Communist Party-led governments and the potential for access to military installations.
The CSIS report suggests that even limited access to these SIGINT capabilities would significantly enhance China’s ability to monitor and communicate with its space assets and intercept data from US satellites.
It says that China’s spy facilities in Cuba raise concerns for US policymakers and regional partners, as China’s gradual expansion in Cuba could have long-term strategic implications for the US.
China recognizes Cuba’s strategic importance due to its location in the Caribbean, a location that allows it to control the maritime approaches to the US, effectively blocking the US without actually enforcing a blockade.
China’s increased presence in Cuba could also influence the Caribbean nations that recognize Taiwan to renounce their position. These advantages make Cuba a valuable card in China’s hands should a US-China conflict over Taiwan erupt.
In military terms, Robert Ellis says in a 2023 article for the Peruvian Army Center for Strategic Studies that even before hostilities, China would likely deploy military personnel into Latin America to support intelligence collection and special operations.
Ellis adds that these personnel might prepare for the disruption of crucial US facilities or routes such as the Panama Canal, observe US military operations from the Caribbean or even plan attacks against the US homeland.
Ellis notes that China might also use intelligence or special operations personnel to create diversionary crises within the region affecting the US, such as disrupting supply chains or creating a food crisis. He mentions that these forces might foment economic or political destabilization in US partner countries, leveraging economically dependent anti-US partners to support its efforts.
He also says that China may solicit support from extra-hemispheric anti-US partners like Russia and Iran and in-region partners like Venezuela and Nicaragua. Ellis adds that China could conduct economic or other sabotage to distract or indirectly impact the US, facilitated by the significant presence of Chinese companies in the region.
Beyond Cuba, China has deployed a multi-prong strategy to increase its influence in Latin America, featuring economic, political, information and cyber elements.
In a June 2023 Brookings Institution commentary, Jessica Brandt says that China has used its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to expand its engagement with more than 20 countries in Latin America to gain leverage that it can exert to geopolitical effect in the future.
However, Brandt notes that China’s coercive economic activities, which use tactics such as boycotts, import restrictions and export quotas, can foster dependence in Latin American countries and undermine good governance, possibly contributing to illegal migration.
Further, Brandt says that China presents itself as helping Latin American societies in their struggle against hypocritical, overreaching democracies led by the US.
She also says that China’s information operations in Latin America promote a narrative that casts democracy as feckless and hypocritical while touting the benefits of its autocratic system of governance. For instance, she points out that China has been keen to emphasize US hypocrisy in promoting human rights while mistreating migrants.
Brandt also says that China has provided surveillance systems to at least nine Latin American countries, with such technology possibly undermining human rights and contributing to illegal migration.
These developments may challenge longstanding US dominance over Latin America, as defined by the Monroe Doctrine. This doctrine asserts that any intervention in the political affairs of the Americas by foreign powers is a potentially hostile act against the US.
In a June 2023 Irregular Warfare Initiative article, Daniel Vrablic notes that longstanding US preeminence in Latin America may be ending. Vrablic notes that China has accelerated its trade with the region, with more than US$700 billion expected by 2035, creating a gateway for more significant political and military influence.
Vrablic says that Russia has increasingly sought to break US partnerships with Latin American countries and play a role as a leading arms supplier, with Iran also attempting to reduce the US military footprint in the region. He argues that the US should develop a strategy to deter China and Russia, its near-peer adversaries, from making further inroads into Latin America.
He points out that these revisionist powers create spheres of influence that undermine the US-led rules-based international order. Vrablic argues this has exacerbated US security challenges such as the flow of illegal drugs through the US-Mexico border, organized crime groups that erode the rule of law by bribing politicians and law enforcement, and a marked democratic decline in Latin America and the US.
Vrablic says that Latin America is a region where the US does not have the advantage of geographical standoff versus its near-peer adversaries, making it imperative for the US to rethink its approach by offering new diplomatic and security overtures.
In line with that, Anthony Constantini mentions in a February 2023 article for The National Interest (TNI) that a “Monroe Doctrine Plus” should redirect attention to US interests, advocating pragmatism rather than focusing on an ideological approach.
Further, Constantini says that Monroe Doctrine Plus should use old and existing alliances and avoid contorting US national interests to serve old alliances. He emphasizes that should the US renege on its commitments in Europe and East Asia, Europe may opt for a neutral position in a Taiwan conflict, Eurasia may fall under Sino-Russian hegemony and the US may struggle to contain Chinese influence in Latin America.