The announcement that the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has opened an investigation into legislator Puma Shen Pao-Yang of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan marks a new and alarming phase in Beijing’s campaign to suppress dissent beyond its borders. The probe, initiated by the Municipal Public Security Bureau of Chongqing (a directly administered municipality in Southwestern PRC), accuses Shen of “separatism”―a charge that in China carries penalties as severe as life imprisonment or even death.
This development represents the first known enforcement of Beijing’s new judicial guidelines targeting so-called “Taiwan independence separatists.” It underscores the Communist regime’s growing willingness to use its domestic legal system as a weapon of transnational control. What distinguishes this case from earlier actions is its extraterritorial ambition. Shen, a member of the Democratic Progressive Party, is a sitting legislator in the ROC’s Legislative Yuan (the unicameral legislature of ROC) and co-founder of the Kuma Academy, also known as the Black Bear Academy, a Taiwanese non-profit civil defence and security education organization which promotes awareness of disinformation and hybrid warfare, providing training to civilians on a variety of topics. He operates entirely within the Taiwanese democratic system—one with its own constitution, judiciary, and civil liberties.
Yet, by treating him as subject to Chinese law, Beijing is asserting that its authority extends across the Taiwan Strait, to a territory it does not govern. This marks a sharp escalation in the PRC’s political warfare against ROC, one that redefines criticism, academic activity, and civic education as criminal acts under Beijing’s expanding notion of “national security.”
The PRC’s pursuit of Shen follows a pattern of legal intimidation designed to blur the line between domestic law enforcement and geopolitical coercion. For this reason, a Human Rights Watch statement calls the move a blatant infringement of fundamental human rights. This characterisation reflects growing unease among international observers over the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) use of its courts and police to police speech abroad.
Shen’s alleged crime stems from his work with Kuma Academy, a topic directly tied to ROC’s growing vulnerability to the PRC influence operations. For Beijing, such initiatives represent, in fact, ideological opposition to its “One-China Principle,” which insists the island of Taiwan is part of its territory. Thus, Shen’s civic engagement has been reframed as “separatist activity,” with the PRC’s authorities labelling Kuma Academy a “pro-Taiwan independence separatist organisation.”
This investigative move is significant because it demonstrates how Beijing is institutionalising repression through formal judicial guidelines rather than relying solely on ad hoc sanctions or rhetorical threats. By codifying persecution into law, the Communist regime seeks to normalise extraterritorial prosecution of Taiwanese citizens, making it a tool of state policy rather than an occasional act of political retaliation.
The targeting of Shen is not an isolated incident. In recent years, several Taiwanese citizens have faced harsh sentences in mainland China on similar charges.
In August 2024, activist Yang Chih-yuan was sentenced to nine years in prison for “separatism,” accused of promoting Taiwanese sovereignty. Just months later, in February 2025, publisher Li Yanhe, who ran a Taipei-based company that produced books on the politics of the PRC, was given a three-year sentence for “inciting secession.” Both men were detained while travelling in the PRC, illustrating the risks faced by Taiwanese citizens who cross into mainland territory.
What sets Shen’s case apart is that it represents a purely extraterritorial application of the PRC law. Unlike Yang and Li, Shen has not set foot in the PRC’s territory. Yet Beijing’s prosecutors claim jurisdiction over his political and civic activities in the ROC—a stance that legal experts say violates international norms and erodes the boundary between sovereign jurisdictions.
The precedent this sets is ominous: under Beijing’s logic, any Taiwanese citizen — politician, activist, or ordinary voter could theoretically face criminal prosecution under PRC law for expressing support for the ROC’s democracy.
Beijing’s resort to criminal law as a mechanism of cross-strait intimidation reflects its broader strategy of lawfare—the use of legal systems to achieve political ends. The CCP’s judicial apparatus, long criticised for lacking independence, now serves as an extension of state propaganda and coercion.
In this context, “separatism” functions less as a legitimate criminal charge than as a political label, enabling the regime to classify dissent and national identity as criminal acts.
The PRC’s latest judicial guidelines go beyond symbolic threats. They authorise asset freezes, family sanctions, and travel bans, extending punishment to relatives and associates of those designated “die-hard Taiwan independence elements.”
Shen’s father’s business was reportedly targeted following his son’s earlier inclusion on a sanctions list, highlighting the collective nature of reprisal—a tactic reminiscent of authoritarian practices where guilt by association enforces obedience through fear.
The CCP’s intent is unmistakable: to discourage political pluralism within ROC by showing that even participation in the island’s lawful democratic institutions can provoke severe retribution.
By criminalising engagement in civic organisations like Kuma Academy, Beijing signals that no expression of Taiwanese identity is beyond its reach.
For ROC’s 23 million citizens, the investigation into Shen sends a stark and chilling message. It suggests that Beijing’s concept of “national unity” overrides any notion of jurisdiction, sovereignty, or individual rights.
The campaign against so-called separatists mirrors the national security crackdown in Hong Kong, where local activists and journalists were prosecuted under broad laws for peaceful political activities. In once-special-status Hong Kong, the introduction of sweeping security laws― the National Security Law on June 30, 2020, and the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance on March 23, 2024―effectively dismantled the city’s civil society; Taiwan now faces the threat of being drawn into a similar model of coercion from afar.
By expanding the scope of the PRC law to include ROC individuals, Beijing is effectively criminalising self-governance. Taiwan’s entire democratic system—its legislature, political parties, and civil organisations—is founded on the premise that the ROC is distinct from the PRC. To treat that distinction as illegal is to declare Taiwan’s democracy itself unlawful.
The consequences extend beyond legal symbolism; they create an atmosphere of constant surveillance and insecurity for those engaged in public life, reinforcing Beijing’s psychological warfare against the island.
Beijing’s assertion of authority over non-mainland citizens raises significant questions about jurisdictional overreach under international law. Legal scholars note that criminal laws typically apply within a state’s territory or to its nationals abroad.
By claiming the right to prosecute citizens of another self-governing entity for activities conducted on their own soil, the PRC is defying the fundamental principle of sovereignty.
The HRW report highlights that these tactics are part of a broader pattern of transnational repression, where authoritarian states extend coercive tools beyond their borders to silence critics.
The Communist regime’s use of extraterritorial jurisdiction has already drawn condemnation in cases involving Uyghur activists, exiled Hong Kong campaigners, and overseas Chinese dissidents. And the inclusion of ROC politicians in this framework underscores how Beijing’s legal warfare has become both global and systematic.
Moreover, the implications of these actions reach far beyond individual cases. They threaten to destabilise cross-strait relations, already strained by military manoeuvres and diplomatic isolation campaigns.
By treating ROC’s elected representatives in Taiwan as criminals under the PRC law, Beijing effectively denies the legitimacy of the island’s democratic government. This posture heightens the risk of confrontation while eroding prospects for dialogue. The investigation into Puma Shen is more than a domestic legal matter; it is a political declaration of authority that challenges the very notion of Taiwan’s autonomy. Through its application of “separatism” laws to individuals outside its jurisdiction, Beijing is signalling that it views Taiwanese democracy not merely as a political rival but as an existential threat to its control.
The message is unmistakable: participation in Taiwan’s democratic process, expression of national identity, or advocacy for civic education can all be construed as crimes against the PRC state.
In weaponizing its legal system to pursue citizens of a self-governing democracy, Beijing has deepened its campaign of cross-border repression and redrawn the limits of its authoritarian reach—one indictment at a time.
/bitterwinter.org