Africa has become a critical arena for China’s military and security strategy beyond its border. The establishment of the PLA overseas base in Djibouti and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) which includes 53 African countries, and is one of the first multilateral forums outside China’s periphery. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has a notable presence on the African continent with deployments in Djibouti, approximately 2000 Chinese troops on-duty across five African nations covering 17 United Nations peacekeeping missions and for counter piracy operations. There is speculation that the PLA is considering establishing additional military bases in Africa, potentially in Equatorial Guinea, Angola, and Namibia on the Atlantic coast. China is strengthening its influence over African nations, including their military leaders, and increasing arms sales through multilateral forums and military education programs. However, this growing influence raises concerns about the potential threat to the sovereignty of African countries.
The Flag Following the Economy
The People’s Republic of China’s security and military cooperation with Africa is viewed as a critical factor in safeguarding its investments and infrastructure established through the Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing has repeatedly emphasized the importance of strengthening and improving its military cooperation with Africa. This collaboration is essential for maintaining the stability and security needed for these projects to prosper. So is China’s security cooperation with African nations solely to protect its economic interests or does it have wider geopolitical goals in and around the continent?
Through its Global Security Initiative (GSI), China is in a way aiming to expand its global influence and reshape the international security order. At the 2024 FOCAC summit held in Beijing from September 4 to 6, the Chinese President linked China-Africa security cooperation to the GSI. Xi Jingping declared that China will assist and prioritize Africa for the implementation of the GSI. According to the USIP project, ‘Tracking China’s Global Security Initiative,’ “GSI-related advances in Africa are part and parcel of Beijing’s larger strategy for competing globally and regionally with the United States.”
Nothing exemplifies China’s growing strategic interests in Africa, such as the evolution of the Djibouti base since its establishment as a support facility in 2017 into a key logistics and combat support hub by 2024. Today China’s overseas military base in Djibouti includes a naval pier, with advanced infrastructure, improved communication systems and expanded storage facilities.
China provides a diverse array of military equipment to African nations, including aircraft, ammunition, armored vehicles, artillery, drones, electronic warfare systems, firearms, missiles, radar and rockets. These items are often sold at competitive prices, making them appealing to African countries. Additionally, the sales are frequently bundled with flexible financing arrangements, military cooperation, and officer training programs.
Though exact figures can vary, China’s military sales to Africa have generated significant revenue. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China’s arms exports to Sub-Saharan Africa have been substantial, with 21 countries receiving large deliveries between 2019 and 2023. As per defense publication, an estimated seven in 10 African armies now use Chinese made armored vehicles. It is a revenue-driver for China, whose dealers hawk arms to African nations at cut-rate prices, and this further helps Beijing spread its influence. Paul Nantulya of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies told The Economist, “There is a larger architecture here,..Weapons sales fit into China wanting to be seen as a preferred partner.”
Often referred to as the “Benin Model,” China’s strategy in Benin, a Sahelian state, involved a combination of economic investments and military assistance, military donations, and strategic partnerships to bolster its influence.
Additionally, the Chinese naval fleet, led by the guided-missile destroyer Nanning, along with the frigate Sanya and the supply ship Weishan Hu, has made several visits to Africa. In July 2023, the fleet visited Cape Town, South Africa, and made stops in countries like Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria, Gabon, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Military Political Work
China has gained a significant competitive edge by offering military training opportunities in Africa. Through strategic initiatives such as the Chinese Professional Military Education (PME), China provides training programs for African military personnel. These programs primarily advance China’s governance model and reinforce political and military relationships. Every year, thousands of African military officers from various nations attend training programs in China, engaging in dialogues and exchanges with their Chinese counterparts. Many graduates of these programs eventually assume prominent roles in their countries’ militaries and governments. PME is a multifaceted strategy that expands military engagement as part of Beijing’s soft power campaign.
Chinese Inroads into the Atlantic
Indications are that China is planning to establish a new military base in Equatorial Guinea, which would be its first permanent military presence on the Atlantic side of the African continent. This move aligns with China’s broader strategy to expand its global influence and safeguard its investments and interests. Reports indicate that the Port of Bata is being considered by Beijing as the most suitable location for this potential base due to its modern infrastructure and strategic location, and it already hosts significant Chinese investments and upgrades by state-owned enterprises. This anticipated base would enhance China’s capacity to project military power into the Atlantic Ocean and further cement its presence in Africa.
China Aims to Offer Alternatives to the Western Led Initiatives in Africa but these
The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been actively involved in anti-piracy operations in Africa, particularly in the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean. This is an additional layer to their bilateral relationships with African countries. However, what’s notable about this is that China treated its anti-piracy operations as more exclusive than the UN or US led operations in the regions. While it participated in the anti-piracy efforts launched in 2009 Operation Ocean Shield and the US-led Combined Task Force 151, since then China has chosen to independently deploy naval forces to combat piracy. So for almost a decade now, Chinese efforts in the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean have largely been conducted separately.
At the 2018 FOCAC summit in Beijing, China and African nations enthusiastically agreed to deepen their cooperation by aligning Africa’s Union’s (AU) Agenda 2063 development strategies with the BRI. However, as in other regions, many African countries too have faced rising debt levels due to BRI projects, leading to financial strain and concerns about debt sustainability. Local protests against BRI projects in Africa have been increasing like the Lamu Coal-Fired Power Plant in Kenya which, facing significant opposition from local communities, had to be cancelled in 2019. The Chinese-owned Collum Coal Mine in Zambia has witnessed significant protests against poor working conditions and low wages.
There are concerns that through its private security companies, it has been pushing arms into Africa. This combination of military and private sector involvement has led to an increased presence of Chinese arms in conflict zones across Africa.
China’s peacekeeping roles in Africa have also been a subject of scrutiny and debate. There is increasing evidence to suggest that while on the face of it China’s involvement in peacekeeping in Africa’s conflict zones is portrayed as a humanitarian effort to maintain peace in reality, peacekeeping is a garb to protect its investments, gain military experience, and enhance its geopolitical influence.
There are apprehensions China is considering the implementation of its “Benin Model” strategies to other Sahelian states like Mali and Burkina Faso. Indicating an eagerness to engage more deeply in the region’s security and development, China has already pledged support for regional security efforts, such as the G5 Sahel Joint Force.
The fact is that Chinese military aid has more often than not found a niche in countries where Western partners have taken themselves out of the game for reasons like a military coup; which then compels the US to reevaluate its support of that particular African nation. So everytime there is an opening in the market, China fills the void as it does not have the same constraints in terms of norms which have guided the Western nations. For instance in the Sudan conflict, China’s approach contrasts with that of other countries, such as the US, which has imposed sanctions on leaders of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
Overall in Africa, China presents itself as kind of the leader of the global south, in opposition to the liberal world, pointing to their example of peaceful rise, as an incredibly persuasive alternative to the template offered by the West neo-liberal order. Beijing’s playbook is to capitalize on discontent with the existing order and wherever possible show that it can help change
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